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The Long Road to Dignity: The Wrong of Segregation 
and What the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Had to Change 
Paul Finkelman∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
The Vice President of the United States was meeting with his 
former Senate colleague, the arch-segregationist John Stennis of 
Mississippi. In 1963, no one in Congress embodied racism and 
segregation more than Senator Stennis. And no state symbolized the 
violent and murderous opposition to racial equality more than 
Mississippi, which led the nation in creating civil rights martyrs 
even before the murders in Philadelphia, Mississippi.1 One protest 
song of the 1960s famously described Mississippi as “the land 
you’ve torn out the heart of.”2 
Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson knew Stennis would never 
support the civil rights legislation proposed by President Kennedy, 
but he wanted Stennis to understand his deep hostility to 
segregation. So Johnson described how his personal cook—who 
Johnson pointed out was “a college graduate”3—and her husband 
would drive his official car, “the Cadillac limousine of the Vice 
President of the United States,” from Washington to Texas.4 
Because they were black, the Wrights could not find motels where 
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 1. See Civil Rights Martyrs, S. POVERTY L. CENTER, http://www.splcenter 
.org/civil-rights-memorial/civil-rights-martyrs (last visited Mar. 11, 2014) 
[http://perma.cc/7VBQ-TKRA] (archived Apr. 9, 2014). 
 2. See Phil Ochs, Here’s to the State of Mississippi, on THERE BUT FOR 
FORTUNE (Elektra Records 1989), available at http://www.metrolyrics.com/heres-
to-the-state-of-mississippi-lyrics-phil-ochs.html [http://perma.cc/D9ME-YJVA] 
(archived Apr. 9, 2014). 
 3. ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: MASTER OF THE 
SENATE 889 (2002) [hereinafter CARO, MASTER OF THE SENATE]. 
 4. Id. 
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they could stay or restaurants where they could dine.5 Johnson 
personalized this for the senator from Mississippi, noting that when 
“[t]hey drove through your state and when they got hungry, they 
stopped at grocery stores on the edge of town in colored areas and 
bought Vienna sausages and beans and ate them with a plastic 
spoon.”6 Stennis knew all about this sort of segregation in his home 
state, and he mumbled that he was sure they could find some place 
to eat.7 But Johnson, the sometimes crude master politician from 
rural Texas, ended his jawboning with a story about driving across 
Mississippi for which Stennis had no response: “[W]hen they had to 
go to the bathroom, they would stop, pull off on a side road, and 
Zephyr Wright, the cook of the Vice President of the United States, 
would squat in the road to pee. And you know, John, that’s just bad. 
That’s wrong.”8 
For Lyndon Johnson, segregation had become personal. It was 
not just a violation of people’s rights. It was “bad.” It was “wrong.” 
When Johnson became president, the struggle for passage of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 became personal, and the experience of his 
cook became part of Johnson’s persona and his stock of stories to 
illustrate his politics and passions.9  
In the end, passage of the 1964 Act was a personal triumph for 
Johnson, who twisted arms, lobbied senators, and showed all his 
political skills.10 Although he was a native white Texan, Johnson 
                                                                                                             
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. Johnson offered a more sanitized version of this story in his 
autobiography, The Vantage Point. LYNDON B. JOHNSON, THE VANTAGE POINT 
154 (1971). Johnson told various versions of this story to many people. The events 
probably took place when Johnson was actually Senate majority leader, but 
Johnson, ever the storyteller, changed the date for Stennis. When he was vice 
president, some of his other black staffers, including Eugene Williams and Helen 
White Williams, drove Johnson’s car across the South, and thus the experience of 
the Wrights was repeated over and over again, and Johnson knew about their 
humiliations as well. Id. at 154–55. 
 9. The 1964 Civil Rights Act was 
[a]n Act [t]o enforce the constitutional right to vote, to confer 
jurisdiction upon the district courts of the United States to provide 
injunctive relief against discrimination in public accommodations, to 
authorize the Attorney General to institute suits to protect constitutional 
rights in public facilities and public education, to extend the 
Commission on Civil Rights, to prevent discrimination in federally 
assisted programs, to establish a Commission on Equal Employment 
Opportunity, and for other purposes. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006)). 
 10. The most recent book on the law, The Bill of the Century: The Epic Battle 
for the Civil Rights Act, argues that Johnson, and also Martin Luther King, Jr., are 
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never felt comfortable with segregation or racism. “I never had any 
bigotry in me,” he told one biographer, and the evidence to support 
this contention seems clear.11 When he ran the National Youth 
Administration (NYA) in Texas from 1935 to 1937, he provided 
jobs and aid to students at the state’s four historically black 
segregated colleges, who had previously been “conspicuously 
excluded from federal and state aid programs.”12 One black leader 
recalled that civil rights organizations “began to get word up here 
that there was one NYA director who wasn’t like the others. He was 
looking after Negroes and poor folks and most NYA people weren’t 
doing that.”13 Thus, as a young man in his first political job in 
deeply segregated Texas, Johnson “put together special NYA 
programs for the black young, often financed by secret transfers of 
money from other projects.”14  
When he first came to the Senate, Johnson joined the arch-
segregationists in opposing President Truman’s civil rights 
initiatives on lynching and fair employment.15 His first speech in the 
Senate was made in support of the southern filibuster to block 
passage of President Harry S Truman’s bill to create a Fair 
Employment Practices Commission.16 But in 1956, he was one of 
only three senators from the former Confederacy17 who refused to 
                                                                                                             
 
overly praised for their role in the passage of the law and that “neither deserves all 
the credit, or even the bulk of it,” for the passage of the law. CLAY RISEN, THE 
BILL OF THE CENTURY: THE EPIC BATTLE FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 3 (2014). 
Risen correctly notes that many other politicians played key roles, especially the 
Republican minority leader in the Senate, Everett Dirksen, House Republicans 
John V. Lindsay and William McCulloch, and Deputy Attorney General Nicholas 
Katzenbach. Id. However, it seems clear that without Johnson’s active and 
enthusiastic support the law might never have passed. 
 11. DORIS KEARNS, LYNDON JOHNSON AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 230 
(1976).  
 12. ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: THE PATH TO 
POWER 364 (1982). 
 13. KEARNS, supra note 11, at 231. Unfortunately, Kearns does not say who 
this civil rights activist was, and her footnote is to a secondary source (with no 
page number), which does not in fact contain any of this information. It seems that 
Kearns read this interview somewhere, even though her book does not specify 
where. 
 14. Id. 
 15. CARO, MASTER OF THE SENATE, supra note 3, at 212–15. 
 16. KEARNS, supra note 11, at 106.   
 17. The other two senators were Estes Kefauver and Albert Gore, Sr., both of 
Tennessee. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD 
OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 752 (1975). 
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sign the Southern Manifesto18 against the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Brown v. Board of Education.19 By 1957, he was providing 
“effective leadership in the fight for civil rights laws.”20 Less than a 
decade later, he would “ram to passage the great Civil Rights Acts 
of 1964 and 1965.”21 However much he may have bobbed and 
weaved on civil rights in his first term in the Senate—he admitted 
“that civil rights was not one of my priorities in those days”—
Johnson never played the race card in Texas politics and never 
supported expansions of racism or segregation.22 As he said, “I’m 
not prejudiced nor ever was.”23 This was not a self-serving claim but 
an accurate assessment of his entire career with regard to race 
relations. 
Johnson knew segregation was wrong, and coming from his 
hardscrabble roots in the Texas hill country, he understood that 
ending poverty and race discrimination was “not just [for] Negroes, 
but really it is [for] all of us.”24 Thus he argued that civil rights 
legislation was necessary because all Americans “must overcome 
the crippling legacy of bigotry and injustice.”25 His epiphany may 
have come over the story of Mrs. Wright, but Johnson knew, as only 
a southerner could, the pain, evil, and absurdity of segregation—that 
it was “bad” and “wrong.”26 In retelling the same story—in a less 
crude manner—to the civil rights leader James Farmer,27 Johnson 
noted (as he had to Senator Stennis) that Mrs. Wright was a college 
                                                                                                             
 18. Declaration of Constitutional Principles [The Southern Manifesto], 102 
CONG. REC., S4, 459–60 (1956). Only senators and representatives from the 
former Confederate states signed the Manifesto. Id. at 460. For a full text and 
discussion of the Manifesto, see Southern Manifesto on Integration (March 12, 
1956), PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/rights/sources_document2 
.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2014) [http://perma.cc/S3EH-96ZL] (archived Apr. 9, 
2014); Historical Highlights: The Southern Manifesto of 1956 (March 12, 1956), 
U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES, http://history.house.gov/HistoricalHighlight 
/Detail/35388 (last visited Apr. 7, 2014) [http://perma.cc/9ANW-56TS] (archived 
Apr. 9, 2014).  
 19. See 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 20. CARO, MASTER OF THE SENATE, supra note 3, at 1009. 
 21. Id. 
 22. KEARNS, supra note 11, at 232.  
 23. Id. 
 24. ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: MEANS OF ASCENT 
xx (1990) (quoting Lyndon Baines Johnson, Speech before Congress on Voting 
Rights (Mar. 15, 1965), available at millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail 
/3386 [http://perma.cc/FQ6Z-5TJ6] (archived Apr. 9, 2014)).  
 25. Id.  
 26. CARO, MASTER OF THE SENATE, supra note 3, at 889. 
 27. Farmer was a co-founder and the first national director of CORE 
(Congress of Racial Equality). James Farmer, CORE, http://www.core-
online.org/History/james_farmer.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2014) [http://perma.cc 
/ARJ7-TMWS] (archived Apr. 9, 2014). 
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graduate but was barred from restaurants or bathrooms along 
southern highways.28 Johnson told Farmer, “Well, that hurt me, that 
almost brought me to tears, and I realized how important public 
accommodations were.”29 Because of Mrs. Wright’s experience, 
Johnson vowed “that if ever I had a chance I was going to do 
something about it.”30 That “something” would be the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964.31 
I. THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION: THE BEGINNING OF 
CIVIL RIGHTS 
The 1964 Civil Rights Act was necessary because of the failure 
of the nation to protect civil rights a century earlier. Between 1862 
and 1875, Congress revolutionized American race relations. In 
1862 Congress prohibited the military from returning fugitive 
slaves, whether from enemy masters, loyal masters in the 
Confederacy, or masters in the border states and provided that any 
officers returning fugitive slaves could be court-martialed and 
dismissed from military service.32 Shortly after this, Congress 
abolished slavery in the District of Columbia33 and the federal 
territories.34 In July 1862, Congress provided for the confiscation 
(and emancipation) of slaves owned by Confederates35 and 
authorized the enlistment of black soldiers.36 These laws marked 
                                                                                                             
 28. ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: THE PASSAGE OF 
POWER 489 (2012) [hereinafter CARO, THE PASSAGE OF POWER]. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. The scholarship on the history of the civil rights movement is huge. Key 
places to start include: KLUGER, supra note 17, at 752; RAYMOND ARSENAULT, 
FREEDOM RIDERS: 1961 AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (2007); HUGH 
DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
NATIONAL POLICY, 1960–1972, at 71 (1990). For recent books on the passage of 
the Act, see TODD S. PURDUM, AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME: TWO 
PRESIDENTS, TWO PARTIES AND THE BATTLE FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 
(2014); RISEN, supra note 10. 
 32. An Act to make an Additional Article of War, 12 Stat. 354 (1862). 
 33. An Act for the Release of certain Persons held to Service or Labor in the 
District of Columbia, 12 Stat. 376 (1862). 
 34. An Act to secure Freedom to all Persons Within the Territories of the 
United States, 12 Stat. 432 (1862). 
 35. An Act to suppress Insurrection, to punish Treason and Rebellion, to seize 
and confiscate the Property of Rebels, and for other Purposes, 12 Stat. 589–60 
(1862). 
 36. An Act to amend the Act calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of 
the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions, 12 Stat. 599 (1862). See 
Paul Finkelman, Francis Lieber and the Modern Law of War, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 
2071, 2120 (2013). 
1044 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74 
 
 
 
the beginning of the end of slavery in the United States and the 
slow movement towards providing legal protections and rights for 
African Americans.  
At the end of January 1865, the House of Representatives finally 
passed the Thirteenth Amendment with the necessary two-thirds 
majority and sent it on to the states.37 Illinois ratified it the next day, 
and ten months later, three-quarters of the states had joined in 
ending all slavery in the United States.38  
The Thirteenth Amendment was remarkable in many ways. It 
was the first time that an amendment specifically gave Congress 
enforcement powers.39 It was the first amendment that directly 
impacted private as well as government behavior. It was not merely 
a limitation on government action but on all action.40 Its sweeping 
language—“[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject 
to their jurisdiction” 41—limited the national government, the states, 
and private actors. It was the first Constitutional provision to alter 
the status of individuals in the nation—transforming millions of 
slaves into free people. It was also the first time that the Constitution 
directly affected the ownership of private property, converting 
millions of chattels into free people, who now owned themselves. It 
has also been among the more successful additions to the 
Constitution because no state has ever tried to openly counter the 
Thirteenth Amendment by adopting legislation to recreate slavery or 
authorizing the buying and selling of human beings.42 
                                                                                                             
 37. “The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it 
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. 
V. 
 38. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. “Amendments . . . shall be valid to all Intents 
and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of 
three fourths of the several States . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 39. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 (“Congress shall have power to enforce this 
article by appropriate legislation.”). 
 40. In contrast to the First Amendment, for example, which begins “Congress 
shall make no law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
 41. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
 42. The one exception to this was the practice by some southern states to use 
debt as a way of coercing people to work in what was considered peonage. Federal 
courts and the Supreme Court struck down these laws in a variety of cases from 
Alabama, Georgia, and Florida. See Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671 (M.D. Ala. 1903); 
Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911); United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 
(1914); Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942); Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 
(1944); see also PETE DANIEL, IN THE SHADOW OF SLAVERY: PEONAGE IN THE 
SOUTH, 1901−1969 (1972); William Cohen, Negro Involuntary Servitude in the 
South, 1865−1940: A Preliminary Analysis, 42 J. S. HIST. 31 (1976). In United 
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Many in Congress believed that the total defeat of the 
Confederate armies, the conclusion of the Civil War, the complete 
destruction of the Confederate government, the Emancipation 
Proclamation, and the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment would 
lead to fundamental equality and fairness.43 However, Congress 
instead heard continuous reports of violence directed at the recently 
emancipated slaves, southern blacks who had been free before the 
War began, U.S. Army soldiers stationed in the South, northern 
teachers, ministers, and other humanitarian activists working with 
former slaves, and southern white unionists.44 In mid-December 
1865, Congress took steps to create the Joint Committee on 
Reconstruction to investigate conditions in the South.45 Six months 
later, the Committee published its mammoth report—running nearly 
800 pages—detailing the terrorism of former Confederate soldiers 
and the massive criminal violence they perpetrated on southern 
blacks and their white allies.46  
The Report of the Committee contained seemingly endless 
testimony about the abuse of blacks and white unionists (from the 
North and the South) in the former Confederate states. Numerous 
army officers, judges, politicians, and others testified about beatings, 
murders, and even some attempts to keep blacks in bondage or sell 
them in Cuba where slavery was still legal.47 General Rufus Saxton 
                                                                                                             
 
States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988), the Court oddly held that the 
psychological coercion of mentally disabled persons who were working without 
pay, underfed, and afraid to leave their employers’ property did not violate the 
Thirteenth Amendment. This reflected an earlier Second Circuit case, United 
States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475 (1964), which held that threats of deportation did 
not constitute coercion for migrant workers who feared leaving a farm and thus 
believed they were held in involuntary servitude. Kozminski involved a farmer in 
Michigan, and Shackney involved a farm in Connecticut. See Kozminski, 487 U.S. 
at 934; Shackney, 333 F.2d at 476.  
 43. HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER 
LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1835–1875, at 386–438 (1982). 
 44. In 1860, there were more than 250,000 free blacks in slave jurisdictions, 
including the District of Columbia, but the 11 Confederate states had only about 
125,000 free blacks, with 104,000 of them concentrated in Virginia, North 
Carolina, and Louisiana. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE A-19[:] RACE FOR THE 
UNITED STATES, REGIONS, DIVISIONS, AND STATES: 1860 (2002), available at 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0056/tabA-19.pdf  
[http://perma.cc/K4VK-BESV] (archived Apr. 9, 2014). 
 45. REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION, H.R. REP. NO. 
30-39 (1866). The House first passed a resolution to create the committee on 
December 5, 1865. Id. at iii. The committee was established by a joint resolution 
of the House and Senate on January 12, 1866. Id.  
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. PT. III: GEORGIA, ALABAMA, MISSISSIPPI, ARKANSAS, at 43.  
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reported that in Edgefield County, South Carolina, one “freedman 
[and] three children, two male and one female, were stripped naked, 
tied up, and whipped severely” and a woman was given a hundred 
lashes while tied to a tree.48 Another man was whipped with a stick, 
while two children were also whipped.49 General George Armstrong 
Custer noted that in Texas more than 500 former Confederates had 
been charged with murdering blacks or white unionists, but no one 
had been convicted.50 Blacks, however, were routinely convicted 
and jailed for minor offenses.51 Custer reported, “[I]t is of weekly, if 
not of daily, occurrence that freedmen are murdered. Their bodies 
are found in different parts of the country,” but no whites were ever 
charged in these cases, even when their identities were known.52 
From Georgia, General Charles Howard (whose brother, Major 
General Oliver Otis Howard, was the head of the Freedmen’s 
Bureau) told of attempts to illegally transport free blacks to Cuba 
where they could be sold as slaves.53 Some southern planters refused 
to admit that their now-emancipated slaves were in fact free, telling 
them that the Emancipation Proclamation was a myth.54 The 
Assistant Commissioner of the Freedmen’s Bureau in Louisiana 
reported that “I have had delegations to frequently come and see 
me—delegations composed of men who, to my face, denied that the 
proclamation issued by President Lincoln was a valid instrument,” 
and “[c]onsequently they have claimed that their negroes were 
slaves and would again be restored to them.”55 The former slave 
owners—who insisted that they were still slaveholders—believed 
that “the Supreme Court would pronounce” the Emancipation 
Proclamation “invalid.”56 A minister from Chicago reported that in 
the vicinity of Jackson, Mississippi, at least one black was murdered 
every day in a two-month period and that every day two to three 
blacks were murdered in the rest of the state.57 This witness 
                                                                                                             
 48. Id. PT. I: VIRGINIA, NORTH CAROLINA, SOUTH CAROLINA, at 233. 
 49. Id. at 233. 
 50. Id. PT. IV: FLORIDA, LOUISIANA, TEXAS, at 75. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. PT. III: GEORGIA, ALABAMA, MISSISSIPPI, ARKANSAS, at 43 (testimony 
of General Charles Howard). See Oliver O. Howard, CIV. WAR TR., http://www 
.civilwar.org/education/history/biographies/oliver-howard.html (last visited Apr. 
7, 2014) [http://perma.cc/G5BA-U3XC] (archived Apr. 9, 2014); WILLIAM S. 
MCFEELY, YANKEE STEPFATHER: GENERAL O. O. HOWARD AND THE FREEDMEN 
(1968). 
 54. REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE, PT. III: GEORGIA, ALABAMA, 
MISSISSIPPI, ARKANSAS, at 42. 
 55. Id. PT. IV: FLORIDA, LOUISIANA, TEXAS, at 79.  
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. at 64. 
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catalogued numerous horrendous murders of blacks throughout 
Alabama, including whites slitting the throats of young black 
children.58 
Parts of Louisiana had been under the control of the United 
States since 1862, and the U.S. Army had troops throughout the 
state.59 This military presence probably reduced the amount of 
violence against blacks, northerners, and unionists. But almost 
everyone who testified about conditions in Louisiana asserted that if 
the army left, it would be disastrous for blacks and the many white 
unionists in the state. Thus, a former naval officer from 
Massachusetts, who became involved in business in the South, 
reported that there was “a very large class of . . . people in Alabama, 
Mississippi, and Louisiana” who would shoot or murder blacks.60 A 
lawyer in New Orleans reported that among most whites there was 
“strong opposition . . . to the education and moral improvement of 
the blacks”61 and most whites in the state believed that blacks would 
only work “by the application of physical force.”62 The implication 
was clear: Whites wanted to create a new form of coercive labor, 
supported by a legal superstructure and physical violence.  
Even with the army in the state, violence was common. A 
Freedman’s Bureau official in the state noted that people who 
worked for him were threatened with murder and “driven back to 
the boats” when they attempted to dock in a rural area to set up 
schools for blacks.63 He reported schools being burned down and 
white teachers being frightened away.64 The only schools for blacks 
he could establish in some parts of the state were on military 
bases.65 Others reported strong opposition to any blacks owning real 
estate in Louisiana, even though free blacks in the state had owned 
                                                                                                             
 58. Id. at 65. 
 59. The city of New Orleans fell to combined forces of the United State Navy 
and Army on April 27–28, 1862. See Terry L. Jones, The Fall of New Orleans, 
N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (Apr. 25, 2012, 12:30 PM), http://opinionator.blogs 
.nytimes.com/2012/04/25/the-fall-of-new-orleans/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 
[http://perma.cc/E7XS-RT9Z] (archived Apr. 9, 2014). A few days later the state 
capital, Baton Rouge, fell to American forces. Terry L. Jones, The Battle of Baton 
Rouge, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (Aug. 3, 2012, 9:30 PM), http://opinionator 
.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/03/the-battle-of-baton-rouge [http://perma.cc/XG7D-
Z4WS] (archived Apr. 9, 2014). 
 60. REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE, PT. III: GEORGIA, ALABAMA, 
MISSISSIPPI, ARKANSAS, at 4. 
 61. Id. at 24. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. PT. IV: FLORIDA, LOUISIANA, TEXAS, at 79. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 79–80. 
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real estate before the War.66 A Freedmen’s Bureau official said that 
“[t]he feeling there [in Louisiana] is unanimous that they shall not 
own an inch of land or have any schools” but that most Louisiana 
whites were more “hostile” to black land ownership than 
education.67 Many of the people who reported on Louisiana agreed 
with Captain D.E. Haynes, an army veteran and sheriff under 
military authority, that Union men and black veterans were “not 
safe” in Louisiana and only the presence of the U.S. Army protected 
them.68 Haynes asserted that “[i]f there were no interference from a 
superior power,” the former slaves in Louisiana “would be in a 
worse condition than they were when in a state of slavery.”69 Since 
the end of the War, Haynes had been shot at and his house had been 
burned by Confederate veterans who had become terrorists.70 A 
Freedmen’s Bureau official in Louisiana reported that the police in 
New Orleans arbitrarily and illegally arrested blacks and “conducted 
themselves towards the freedmen, in respect to violence and ill 
usage, in every way equal to the old days of slavery.”71 This official 
predicted that if the army left, the whites “would return to the old 
system of slavery,” although many other whites in the state had an 
alternative future in mind.72 If the army left, the blacks 
will be murdered . . . . It will not be persecution merely; it 
will be slaughter; and I doubt whether the world has ever 
known the like. These southern rebels, when the power is 
once in their hands, will stop with nothing short of 
extermination. Governor [James Madison] Wells himself 
told me that he expected in ten years to see the whole 
colored race exterminated, and that conviction is shared very 
largely among the white people of the south. It has been 
threatened by leading men there that they would exterminate 
the freedmen. They have said so in my hearing.73 
The committee learned of new southern laws—passed by former 
Confederates—that discriminated against blacks (and sometimes 
their white allies) in voting,74 property ownership, working 
                                                                                                             
 66. Id. at 56. 
 67. Id. at 82. 
 68. Id. at 60–61. 
 69. Id. at 62. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 79. 
 72. Id. at 83.  
 73. Id. 
 74. The Florida Constitution, for example, did not allow people who had 
moved into the state while soldiers to vote and limited the franchise and jury 
service to whites. Id. at 26. The Georgia and Arkansas Constitutions similarly 
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conditions and contracts, and court proceedings.75 Mississippi made 
it a crime to sell real estate to blacks and also criminalized hiring 
blacks who had previously been hired by someone else.76 Such laws 
were designed to make blacks landless peasants, tied to their old 
plantations like serfs. In Louisiana, there was a revival of patrols 
that resembled antebellum slave patrols and the use of other 
antebellum procedures to arrest blacks who did not have proof of 
employment.77 Other patrols, made up of white militiamen who 
were mostly former Confederate soldiers, were used “to prevent the 
negroes from going from one place to another,” just as slave patrols 
had been used.78 
Perhaps most pernicious were the vagrancy laws of these post-
Confederate regimes, which were designed to recreate slavery as 
much as possible. Alabama’s law “Concerning Vagrants and 
Vagrancy” allowed for the incarceration in the public work house of 
any “laborer or servant who loiters away his time, or refuses to 
comply with any contract for a term of service without just cause.”79 
Mississippi’s Civil Rights Act of 1865 provided that if any laborer 
quit a job before the end of the contract period, he or she would lose 
all wages earned up to that time.80 “This allowed employers to 
mistreat and overwork laborers, knowing they dare not quit. Indeed, 
a shrewd employer could purposefully make life miserable for 
workers at the end of a contract term, in hopes that they would quit 
and forfeit all wages.”81 Any blacks “with no lawful employment or 
business” in Mississippi would be considered vagrants and could be 
                                                                                                             
 
prevented blacks from voting or serving on juries. Id. PT. III: GEORGIA, ALABAMA, 
MISSISSIPPI, ARKANSAS, at 85–86. 
 75. For example, both Mississippi and Alabama allowed blacks to testify in 
court only if at least one of the parties was black or if a white was prosecuted for 
harming a black. 1865 Ala. Acts 90 (“[p]rotect[ing] Freedmen in Their Rights of 
Person and Property in this State”); 1865 Miss. Laws 82 (“an Act for conferring 
Civil Rights on Freedmen, and for other purposes”). However, if a white 
southerner murdered another white, blacks could not be witnesses at the trial. For 
restrictions on black testimony in Georgia, see REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE, 
PT. III: GEORGIA, ALABAMA, MISSISSIPPI, ARKANSAS, at 85–86.  
 76. REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE, PT. IV: FLORIDA, LOUISIANA, TEXAS, 
at 52.  
 77. Id. at 79. 
 78. Id. at 83. 
 79. 1865 Ala. Acts 90 (“an Act for amending the Vagrant Laws of the state”). 
See also Paul Finkelman, The Historical Context of the Fourteenth Amendment, 13 
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 389, 403 (2004).  
 80. 1865 Miss. Laws 82 (“an Act for conferring Civil Rights on Freedmen, 
and for other purposes”). See also Finkelman, supra note 79, at 403.  
 81. Finkelman, supra note 79, at 403. 
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fined up to $50.82 Blacks who could not pay the fine would be 
forcibly hired out to whomever would pay the fine, thus creating 
another form of unfree labor.83 The same Act created a $1 poll tax 
for all free blacks.84 Anyone not paying the tax could also be 
declared a vagrant and thus assigned to some white planter to work 
at hard labor.85 These laws also prohibited blacks from renting land 
or houses in towns or cities,86 in effect forcing blacks into the 
countryside where they would become agricultural peasants. 
The murderous and barbaric violence, openly homicidal 
intentions of whites, new laws, and repressive application of old law 
detailed by these witnesses underscored the refusal of many 
southern whites to accept black freedom or the outcome of the War 
that they had started. Major General John W. Turner reported that in 
his military district in Virginia “all of the [white] people” were 
“extremely reluctant to grant to the negro his civil rights—those 
privileges that pertain to freedom, the protection of life, liberty, and 
property before the laws, the right to testify in courts, etc.”87 Turner 
noted that whites were “reluctant even to consider and treat the 
negro as a free man, to let him have his half of the sidewalk or the 
street crossing.”88 They would only “concede” such rights to blacks 
“if it is ever done, it will be because they are forced to do it.”89 
II. THE LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO SOUTHERN 
TERRORISM 
Congress responded to this voluminous testimony with the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment, which was 
passed in 1866 and ratified in 1868.90 In 1870 and 1871, Congress 
                                                                                                             
 82. 1865 Miss. Laws 86 (“An Act for regulating the relation of Master and 
Apprentice, as it related to Freedmen, Free Negroes, and Mulattoes”). See also 
Finkelman, supra note 79, at 403. 
 83. 1865 Miss. Laws 86. For a discussion of this law before the Joint 
Committee, see REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE, PT. IV: FLORIDA, LOUISIANA, 
TEXAS, at 143. See also a similar law in Florida, entitled An Ordinance on 
Vagrancy, Act of Nov., 4, 1865, reprinted in REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE, 
PT. IV: FLORIDA, LOUISIANA, TEXAS, at 32–33. 
 84. 1865 Miss. Laws 86. 
 85. 1865 Miss. Laws 90. See also Finkelman, supra note 79, at 403. 
 86. Most of these laws are reprinted throughout the REPORT OF THE JOINT 
COMMITTEE. 
 87. REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE, PT. I: VIRGINIA, NORTH CAROLINA, 
SOUTH CAROLINA, at 4.  
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Civil Rights Act of 1866, An Act to protect all Persons in the United 
States in their Civil Rights, and furnish the Means of their Vindication, 14 Stat. 27 
(1866). 
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passed a series of statutes, often called the Ku Klux Klan Acts, 
designed to combat white terrorist organizations and violence.91 
These laws were effective in helping to suppress the Klan in South 
Carolina and elsewhere,92 but in the end the Supreme Court 
undermined their value and generally prevented the national 
government from using its powers—and the post-War legislation 
and amendments—to protect blacks from the growing violence in 
the South.93  
In 1875, Congress passed what would be the last civil rights 
legislation of the period, guaranteeing blacks equal access to public 
facilities, such as restaurants, hotels, and modes of public 
transportation.94 This law to a great extent covered many of the 
public accommodations protections that would later be incorporated 
into the Civil Rights Act of 1964.95 Had the federal government 
enforced and implemented the 1875 law, the wrongs of segregation 
might never have developed. But this is not what happened. 
In 1883, the Court gutted this statute in The Civil Rights Cases, 
holding that the Fourteenth Amendment did not allow Congress to 
regulate private behavior.96 The Court viewed the Fourteenth 
Amendment in the narrowest way possible, arguing that “[i]t is State 
                                                                                                             
 91. Enforcement Act of 1870, An Act To enforce the Right of Citizens of the 
United States to vote in the several States of the Union, and for other Purposes, 16 
Stat. 140 (1870); The Second Enforcement Act, An Act to amend an Act approved 
May thirty-one, eighteen hundred and seventy, entitled “An Act To enforce the 
Rights of Citizens of the United States to vote in the several States of this Union, 
and for other Purposes,” 16 Stat. 433 (1871); The Third Enforcement Act, An Act 
to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States, and for other Purposes, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). 
 92. See generally LOU FAULKNER WILLIAMS, THE GREAT SOUTH CAROLINA 
KU KLUX KLAN TRIALS, 1871−1872 (1996). 
 93. See Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. 581 (1871); United States v. Reese, 
92 U.S. 214 (1876); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); United 
States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883). One lone exception to this dismal record of 
the Court is its decision in Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884), where the 
Court, under the Fifteenth Amendment, upheld the prosecution of Klansmen for 
beating a former slave to prevent him from voting. 
 94. The Civil Rights Act of 1875, An Act to protect all citizens in their civil 
and legal rights, 18 Stat. 335 (1875). 
 95. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, An Act To enforce the constitutional right 
to vote, to confer jurisdiction upon the district courts of the United States to 
provide injunctive relief against discrimination in public accommodations, to 
authorize the Attorney General to institute suits to protect constitutional rights in 
public facilities and public education, to extend the Commission on Civil Rights, 
to prevent discrimination in federally assisted programs, to establish a 
Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity, and for other purposes, Pub. L. 
No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 243 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) 
(2006)). 
 96. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
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action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion 
of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment.”97 
The Court found that there was no “state action” involved when a 
restaurant refused to serve blacks, a hotel or inn refused to rent 
rooms to blacks, or a streetcar provided separate seating for blacks, 
even though such businesses were licensed by the State, regulated 
by the State, and classically considered public accommodations.98 
The Court cynically ended its opinion by asserting that: 
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of 
beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable 
concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the 
progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere 
citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and 
when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in 
the ordinary modes by which other men’s rights are 
protected.99  
The Court ignored the fact that blacks were being treated in a 
“special” manner only to the extent that they were beginning to face 
massive discrimination throughout the South and less massive but 
still humiliating discrimination in the North. The Court’s own 
jurisprudence from the same year illustrated this. In United States v. 
Harris, the Court held that the national government could not 
prosecute white members of a mob that had broken into a jail and 
killed one black man and severely beaten three others.100 The 
Court’s narrow reading of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
enforcement clause thus precluded the national government from 
protecting the civil rights of African Americans (or anyone else). 
Justice John Marshall Harlan dissented in both cases.101 
Significantly, Harlan was a former slave owner from Kentucky.102 
At this time he was the only native southerner on the Court103 and 
                                                                                                             
 97. Id. at 11. 
 98. Id. at 24–25. 
 99. Id. at 25. 
 100. United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883). 
 101. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 33 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Harris, 
106 U.S. at 644 (Harlan, J. dissenting). 
 102. On Harlan’s early life, see LINDA PRZYBYSZEWSKI, THE REPUBLIC 
ACCORDING TO JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN (1999). 
 103. In 1880 President Hayes appointed William B. Woods to the Court. See 
William B. Woods, 1881-1887, SUPREME CT. HISTORICAL SOC’Y, http://www 
.supremecourthistory.org/history-of-the-court/associate-justices/william-woods- 
1881-1887 (last visited Apr. 10, 2014) [http://perma.cc/B64W-F39G] (archived 
May 12, 2014). Woods was a native of Ohio and had been a Brevetted Major 
General in the U.S. Army, but had remained in the South at the end of the War, 
where he briefly practiced law and entered politics before President Ulysses S. 
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the only member of the Court who had firsthand experience with 
slavery and southern racism. He knew that blacks were the “special 
favorite” of southern lawmakers, only to the extent that southern 
whites seemed to be working especially hard to find new ways to 
discriminate against them. In The Civil Rights Cases, he argued that 
the Fourteenth Amendment allowed the national government to 
protect the rights of blacks to equal accommodations.104 Citing 
antebellum jurisprudence that protected slavery,105 Harlan argued 
that the newly amended Constitution allowed the national 
government to protect the rights of former slaves.106 Harlan stressed 
that the Thirteenth Amendment was designed to do more than 
merely end slavery.107 He argued that “it established and decreed 
universal civil freedom throughout the United States” and this 
freedom included equal access to public facilities.108 He further 
argued that segregation—the denial of access to public facilities—
was a holdover from slavery: 
That there are burdens and disabilities which constitute 
badges of slavery and servitude, and that the power to enforce 
by appropriate legislation, the Thirteenth Amendment may be 
exerted by legislation of a direct and primary character, for the 
eradication, not simply of the institution, but of its badges and 
incidents, are propositions which ought to be deemed 
indisputable.109  
Harlan reminded his fellow justices that every one of them 
agreed that “the Thirteenth Amendment established freedom; that 
there are burdens and disabilities, the necessary incidents of slavery, 
which constitute its substance and visible form.”110 He noted that 
before the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress had 
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which 
                                                                                                             
 
Grant appointed him to a federal judgeship in 1869. Id. It is not clear that Woods 
had any real sense of southern culture or the deep racism and hostility southern 
blacks faced as Reconstruction came to an end. See Thomas Baynes, Jr., William 
B. Woods, in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES, 1789-
1995 (Clare Cushman ed., 2d ed. 1995). 
 104. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S at 33–62 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 105. Id. at 34–35 (citing Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842); Dred Scott 
v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857); Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506 (1859)). 
 106. Id. at 35. 
 107. Id. at 38. 
 108. Id. at 34. 
 109. Id. at 35. 
 110. Id. 
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undertook to remove certain burdens and disabilities, the 
necessary incidents of slavery, and to secure to all citizens of 
every race and color, and without regard to previous 
servitude, those fundamental rights which are the essence of 
civil freedom, namely, the same right to make and enforce 
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to inherit, 
purchase, lease, sell, and convey property as is enjoyed by 
white citizens; that under the Thirteenth Amendment 
Congress has to do with slavery and its incidents; and that 
legislation, so far as necessary or proper to eradicate all 
forms and incidents of slavery and involuntary servitude, 
may be direct and primary, operating upon the acts of 
individuals, whether sanctioned by state legislation or not.111 
Harlan hammered home the argument that equality in the public 
sphere was the hallmark of freedom and any deprivation of that 
equality—whether based on statute or private action—violated both 
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.112 Harlan ended by 
denouncing the absurd contention by the majority that blacks had 
become the “special favorite of the laws”:113  
My brethren say, that when a man has emerged from 
slavery, and by the aid of beneficent legislation has shaken 
off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be 
some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the 
rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite 
of the laws, and when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to 
be protected in the ordinary modes by which other men’s 
rights are protected. It is, I submit, scarcely just to say that 
the colored race has been the special favorite of the laws. 
The statute of 1875, now adjudged to be unconstitutional, is 
for the benefit of citizens of every race and color. What the 
nation, through Congress, has sought to accomplish in 
reference to that race, is—what had already been done in 
every State of the Union for the white race—to secure and 
protect rights belonging to them as freemen and citizens; 
nothing more.114 
For the rest of the 19th century, with only an occasional rare 
exception, African-American civil rights received special disfavor 
                                                                                                             
 111. Id. at 35–36. 
 112. See id. at 33–62. 
 113. Id. at 61. 
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before the Supreme Court.115 Indeed, the late 19th century Court 
became the special enemy of African Americans.116  
Two early transportation cases illustrate how the Court’s 
jurisprudence almost always harmed civil rights and blacks. In 1878, 
in Hall v. DeCuir,117 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a 
Louisiana statute that prohibited segregation on modes of public 
transportation, including ships, traveling within the state.118 The 
Court concluded that forcing the ship to provide equal 
accommodations for blacks in intrastate commerce would burden 
interstate commerce because ships coming into or leaving the state 
might have to reassign passengers to different seats.119 This ruling 
could be seen as “race neutral” because it left seating on the boat 
entirely in the hands of the ship owners as they passed from one 
state to another. Under the Court’s logic the states were precluded 
from regulating race in interstate commerce. 
However, a dozen years later, the Court upheld a Mississippi 
law that mandated railroad segregation on trains that traveled in 
interstate commerce.120 The inconsistency of these two cases is 
obvious from their facts. DeCuir was on a Louisiana boat in 
Louisiana waters when she was denied access to the first-class 
cabin, even though she had paid for the right to use it.121 The Court 
ignored both her civil rights and her contract rights.122 But the 
Louisville, New Orleans, and Texas Railway Company clearly had 
trains traveling in interstate commerce.123 The railroad protested 
Mississippi’s segregation law because the law affected the ability of 
the railroad to sell tickets to whomever wanted to buy them and 
prevented the conductors from seating people in the most economic 
or efficient manner.124 The Court’s jurisprudential inconsistency was 
                                                                                                             
 115. In Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884), the Court upheld the 
prosecution of members of the Ku Klux Klan who beat a former slave to prevent 
him from voting in a federal election. Here, the Court upheld enforcement laws 
under the Fifteenth Amendment.  
 116. See 1 MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 539–67 (2011). 
 117. Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878). 
 118. An Act To enforce the Thirteenth Article of the Constitution of this State, 
and regulate the Licenses mentioned in said thirteenth article, Act No. 38, 1869 
La. Acts 37 (rules for conduct adopted by common carriers shall “make no 
discrimination on account of race or color”). The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld 
this law in DeCuir v. Benson, 27 La. Ann. 1 (1875). 
 119. Hall, 95 U.S. 485. 
 120. Louisville, New Orleans & Texas Ry. Co. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587 
(1890). 
 121. Hall, 95 U.S. at 490. 
 122. See id. at 487–91. 
 123. See id.  
 124. Id.  
1056 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74 
 
 
 
blatant and defied rational explanation. But its social consistency 
was clear: Laws supporting civil rights were suspect; laws creating 
racial inequality and the subordination of blacks were generally 
permissible, unless they were shockingly and outrageously 
discriminatory.125  
In Plessy v. Ferguson, the most infamous segregation case of the 
period, the Court abandoned the state action distinction it had 
developed in The Civil Rights Cases.126 Here the discrimination—a 
requirement of separate seating for blacks on a train that only 
traveled within the state of Louisiana—was based on a state law.127 
There was no interstate commerce issue here, and there was 
obviously state action. This would seem to be exactly the kind of 
situation the Court had in mind in The Civil Rights Cases, when the 
Court said that “[i]t is State action of a particular character that is 
prohibited.”128 But the Court now had new standards. State action 
that separated people by race was not discriminatory as long as the 
facilities were “equal.”129 The concept of “equal” was a legal fiction 
at the time and would remain so until the Court finally overturned 
the separate but equal doctrine six decades later.130 
Following Plessy, the Court continued its war on African 
Americans, upholding all sorts of discrimination on narrow, 
technical grounds or without regard to the nature of the southern 
laws or their consequences. When state laws effectively prohibited 
blacks from serving on juries, the Court found no discrimination 
because the qualifications were race “neutral.”131  
                                                                                                             
 125. The one example of this—and it is the only example in this period—is 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), which involved Chinese-Americans in 
California. In this case, the Court held that a San Francisco ordinance, which 
required that laundries be in brick buildings—unless the sheriff approved an 
exemption—was unconstitutional because the sheriff exempted virtually all white-
owned laundries and never exempted those owned by Chinese immigrants and 
their American-born children. Id. 
 126. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 127. Id. at 540. 
 128. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). 
 129. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550–51. 
 130. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (striking down separate but 
equal in the context of legal education, holding that a law school created for black 
students could never be equal to the existing University of Texas School of Law); 
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (striking down separate 
but equal as applied to public schools); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) 
(formally reversing Plessy in holding unconstitutional segregation in intrastate 
public transportation). On the importance of Sweatt to dismantling segregation, see 
Paul Finkelman, Breaking the Back of Segregation: Why Sweatt Matters, 36 T. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 7, 7–37 (2010). 
 131. See Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896); Smith v. Mississippi, 162 
U.S. 592 (1896); Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898). A fourth case 
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Mississippi, the home of the future Senator Stennis, led the 
South in cleverly preventing blacks from reaching the ballot box or 
the jury box. Mississippi’s 1890 Constitution was explicitly 
designed to eliminate black voting, as even the Mississippi Supreme 
Court acknowledged.132 Known as the “Disfranchisement 
Constitution,” it was remarkably effective. As Benno Schmidt 
noted: 
The new state constitution imposed a variety of suffrage 
qualifications designed to disfranchise blacks. Some, like the 
poll tax, tended to exclude many blacks automatically; 
others, like the literacy test and the requirement to “be able 
to read and write any section of the Constitution of this State 
and give a reasonable interpretation thereof to the county 
registrar,” or the requirement to demonstrate “a reasonable 
understanding of the duties and obligations of citizenship,” 
transparently invited invidious manipulation.133 
Because jury selection was tied to voter registration, the 
Constitution eliminated virtually all black jurors from the state. 
Williams v. Mississippi challenged this situation on behalf of an 
African American named Henry Williams, who faced execution 
after being indicted by an all-white grand jury and convicted by an 
all-white petit jury.134  
In rejecting Williams’s claim of discrimination, the Court 
unblushingly quoted Mississippi’s highest court, which had openly 
declared that the purpose of the 1890 state constitution was to 
discriminate against blacks and that “[w]ithin the field of 
permissible action under the limitations imposed by the federal 
constitution, the convention swept the field of expedients, to 
obstruct the exercise of suffrage by the negro race.”135 The Supreme 
Court might have concluded that this passage proved that 
Mississippi’s constitution and laws violated the Fourteenth and 
                                                                                                             
 
from Louisiana led to the same result. See Murray v. Louisiana, 163 U.S. 101 
(1896). 
 132. In Williams, the Supreme Court quoted the Mississippi Supreme Court’s 
assertion that “[w]ithin the field of permissible action under the limitations 
imposed by the Federal Constitution, the convention swept the field of expedients, 
to obstruct the exercise of suffrage by the negro race.” 170 U.S. at 222. 
 133. Benno C. Schmidt, Juries, Jurisdiction, and Race Discrimination: The 
Lost Promise of Strauder v. West Virginia, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1401, 1462 (1983) 
(quoting MISS. CONST. of 1890 § 264).  
 134. Williams, 170 U.S. 213. See also Murray, 163 U.S. 101. 
 135. Williams, 170 U.S. at 222 (quoting Ratliff v. Beale, 20 So. 865 (Miss. 
1896)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Fifteenth Amendments. But the Court saw no constitutional problem 
with a state that openly declared that its laws and new Constitution 
were designed to disfranchise black voters.136 Nor was the Court 
concerned with the assertion of Mississippi’s justices that: 
By reason of its previous condition of servitude and 
dependencies, this race had acquired or accentuated certain 
peculiarities of habit, of temperament, and of character, 
which clearly distinguished it as a race from the whites; a 
patient, docile people, but careless, landless, migratory 
within narrow limits, without forethought, and its criminal 
members given to furtive offenses, rather than the robust 
crimes of the whites. Restrained by the federal Constitution 
from discriminating against the negro race, the convention 
discriminates against its characteristics, and the offenses to 
which its criminal members are prone.137 
Rather than expressing any concern that Mississippi’s actions 
might have been based on racism and a conscious desire to violate 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, Justice Joseph 
McKenna, writing for the majority, determined that  
nothing tangible can be deduced from this. If weakness were 
to be taken advantage of, it was to be done within the field of 
permissible action under the limitations imposed by the 
federal Constitution, and the means of it were the alleged 
characteristics of the negro race, not the administration of 
the law by officers of the state.138 
Astoundingly, the Court concluded: “It cannot be said, therefore, 
that the denial of the equal protection of the laws arises primarily 
from the constitution and laws of Mississippi; nor is there any 
sufficient allegation of an evil and discriminating administration of 
them.”139 
This dismal history set the stage for the age of Jim Crow in the 
first half of the 20th century. In The Civil Rights Cases, the Court 
determined that the national government had no power to protect 
blacks from private discrimination, even when that discrimination 
was done under the color of law and with the cooperation of state 
officials and when the state—through its law enforcement agencies 
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 138. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 139. Id. 
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and courts—would enforce this private discrimination.140 
Significantly, in this period almost all of the northern states passed 
state civil rights and equal accommodation laws to prohibit such 
behavior.141 But the Court, although dominated by northerners,142 
followed the South’s lead in supporting racism and segregation.143 
Indeed, the only consistent opponent of segregation on the Court in 
this period was the former slave owner from Kentucky, John 
Marshall Harlan.  
III. VOTING AND RIGHTS 
Blacks, of course, might have resisted new modes of segregation 
through the political process. But in most of the South, white 
terrorists and local white law enforcement authorities combined to 
prevent them from voting. By the end of the century, legislation and 
new constitutions in Mississippi, Louisiana, and the other former 
Confederate states had effectively disfranchised virtually all black 
voters in the South.144 In the 1870s and 1880s, the federal 
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//perma.cc/TD47-X3EJ] (archived Apr. 9, 2014). From 1888 to 1909, the Court 
had only two southerners, Harlan and various other justices: Lucius Quintus 
Cincinnatus Lamar of Mississippi (1888–1893); Howell Jackson of Tennessee 
(1893–1895); and Edward Douglass White of Louisiana (1895 until after Harlan’s 
death in 1911). See Timeline of the Justices, supra. In 1909 a third Southerner, 
Horace Lurton of Tennessee, was appointed to the bench. Id. 
 143. For a short history of the Court’s overwhelming support of racism and 
segregation in this period, see 1 UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 116, at 
539−67. 
 144. The classic study of this issue is: J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF 
SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTIONS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE 
ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880-1910 (1974). “Between 1890 and 1908, every state in 
the Deep South adopted a new state constitution, explicitly for the purpose of 
disenfranchising blacks. Various devices were used—poll taxes, literacy tests, 
arbitrary registration practices, felony disenfranchisement (for only those crimes 
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government tried to stop this violence, but in cases like United 
States v. Cruikshank, which came out of Grant Parish, Louisiana, the 
Court refused to allow the federal government to protect black 
voters,145 and in Williams v. Mississippi, the Court ignored the 
intentional discrimination against black voters in the Mississippi 
Constitution.146  
But states did not initially resort to constitutional amendments 
when plain old fraud (mixed with intimidation) would do the trick. 
The history of voting in South Carolina, which had a black majority 
at the end of the Civil War, illustrates this. Starting in 1870, 
significant numbers of blacks voted in the state because of federal 
statutes, federal enforcement of voting rights, and the ratification of 
the Fifteenth Amendment. Indeed, significant black voting 
throughout the former Confederate states led to the election of more 
than 2,000 black officeholders in this period.147 From 1870 until 
1882, black political participation in South Carolina was particularly 
significant. Thus, for four consecutive sessions of Congress in the 
1870s, South Carolina sent two or more of its black citizens to the 
U.S. House of Representatives.148 These political successes reflected 
the fact that African Americans constituted about 60% of the state’s 
population.149  
                                                                                                             
 
that blacks disproportionately committed).” Race, Voting Rights, and Segregation: 
Rise and Fall of the Black Voter, 1868-1922, On the Eve of Complete Black 
Disfranchisement, 1900, U. MICH., http://www.umich.edu/~lawrace/votetour6.htm 
(last visited Apr. 7, 2014) [http://perma.cc/AR9W-2S4E] (archived Apr. 9, 2014). 
 145. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876). 
 146. Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898). See supra notes 131−42 
and accompanying text. 
 147. ERIC FONER, FREEDOM’S LAWMAKERS: A DIRECTORY OF BLACK 
OFFICEHOLDERS DURING RECONSTRUCTION xi (1996). 
 148. JENNIFER MANNING & COLLEEN J. SHOGAN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH 
SERVICE, AFRICAN AMERICAN MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS: 
1870-2012, at 56 (2012), available at http://www.senate.gov/CRSReports/crs-
publish.cfm?pid='0E%2C*PLW%3C%20P%20%20%0A [http://perma.cc/LP64-
785E] (archived Apr. 9, 2014). Robert C. DeLarge, Joseph Rainey, and Robert B. 
Elliott served in the 42nd Congress; Elliott, Rainey, Richard H. Cain, and Alanzo 
Ransier served in the 43rd Congress; Rainey and Robert Smalls served in the 44th 
Congress, and Cain, Rainey, and Smalls served in the 45th Congress. Id. See 
FONER, supra note 147, at 254−57 (listing all as coming from South Carolina and 
providing short biographies of these officeholders).  
 149. In 1870 the U.S. Census found 290,000 whites in South Carolina and 
415,000 blacks; in 1880 there were 319,000 whites in the state and 604,000 
blacks. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE 55[:] SOUTH CAROLINA - RACE AND 
HISPANIC ORIGIN: 1790 TO 1990 (2002), available at http://www.census.gov 
/population/www/documentation/twps0056/tab55.pdf [http://perma.cc/B2HM- 
55HW] (archived Apr. 9, 2014). 
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More than 300 blacks served in public office in South Carolina 
from 1870 until 1876, when Reconstruction formally ended.150 
These included State Supreme Court Justice Jonathan J. Wright, 
Lieutenant Governors Richard H. Gleaves and Alonzo J. Ransier, 
Speakers of the State House of Representatives Robert B. Elliott and 
Samuel J. Lee, Secretaries of State Francis L. Cardozo and Henry E. 
Hayne, and Congressmen Richard H. Cain, Robert C. DeLarge, 
Robert B. Elliott, Joseph H. Rainey, Alonzo J. Ransier, and Robert 
Smalls.151  
As Reconstruction came to an end, some localities in the state 
adopted schemes to prevent blacks from voting in primaries.152 In 
1878, the State instituted the use of separate ballot boxes for state 
and federal elections in an attempt to confuse black voters and 
prevent their ballots from being counted.153 Many of the black 
voters were illiterate former slaves. They understood who they 
wanted to vote for—Republican members of the Party of Lincoln, 
who supported black rights—even though they could not necessarily 
read.154 The new law provided detailed regulations for where 
elections could be held, including naming stores and other buildings 
as polling places on a county-by-county basis.155 However, this 
statute ended with the following language: “The word precinct in 
this Act shall be construed to embrace an area sufficient to provide 
for holding elections for members of Congress and Presidential 
Electors at different stations from those stations where elections are 
held for State and County officers.”156 This law allowed election 
officials to move federal ballot boxes to new locations in an attempt 
to confuse black voters. The Legislature also required separate ballot 
boxes for state and federal elections, even if the election was at the 
same polling place.157  
                                                                                                             
 150. FONER, supra note 147, at 254−57. 
 151. AMERICAN POLITICAL LEADERS, 1789–2005, at 378 (C.Q. Press eds., 
2005); FONER, supra note 147. On Reconstruction in South Carolina, see generally 
THOMAS HOLT, BLACK OVER WHITE: NEGRO POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN SOUTH 
CAROLINA DURING RECONSTRUCTION (1979). 
 152. Orville Vernon Burton, Terence R. Finnegan, Peyton McCrary & James 
W. Loewen, South Carolina, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT 
OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965–1990, at 231 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard 
Grofman eds. 1994) [hereinafter Burton et al., South Carolina]. 
 153. An Act to Amend an Act Entitled “An Act to Establish by Law the Voting 
Precincts in the Various Counties in This State”, 1877–78 S.C. Acts 565. See also 
Burton et al., South Carolina, supra note 152. 
 154. See generally KOUSSER, supra note 144. 
 155. 1877–78 S.C. Acts 565. 
 156. Id.  
 157. An Act to Alter and Amend the Law in Relation to Elections, 1877–78 
S.C. Acts 632.  
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In 1882, the white majority in the South Carolina Legislature 
refined this system further with an insidiously brilliant innovation 
known as the “Eight Box Ballot Law.”158 This law was designed to 
reduce the number of black voters and prevent many of the ballots 
of the remaining voters from being counted. One of the leading 
historians of black voting in the South described the new rules and 
policies: 
South Carolina led the way in manufacturing legal 
obstructions to keep the Negro from the polls. In 1882 its 
lawmakers enacted a registration measure requiring 
individuals of voting age to enroll between May and June of 
that year or to risk permanent exclusion from the suffrage 
lists. Minors were to be enfranchised when they reached the 
age of twenty-one if a registrar found them qualified. In 
addition, citizens were compelled to register each time they 
moved, a stipulation designed to penalize migrating black 
sharecroppers and tenants.159 
The Eight Box Ballot Law was “one of the most clever 
stratagems” adopted in this period to eliminate the black vote,160 and 
“its provisions illustrate how ingenious southern authors could twist 
seemingly neutral devices for partisan and racist purposes.”161 Thus, 
[u]nder this rule, ballots for individual offices had to be 
placed in separate ballot boxes. Put your ballot in the wrong 
box, and it would not be counted. Although the boxes were 
usually labeled properly, this meant little to illiterate black 
voters unable to read the labels. And if this were not enough, 
many election supervisors shifted the boxes around 
periodically. Countless wrongly placed—and hence 
uncounted—ballots were the result.162 
At the same time, the election judges would offer help and guidance 
to the large number of illiterate white voters who would have been 
equally confused by the complicated ballot box scheme.163 
                                                                                                             
 158. An Act to Amend Title II. (Entitled) “Of Elections” of Part I. (Entitled) 
“Of the Internal Administration of the Government” of the General Statutes, 
1881–82 S.C. Acts 1110. 
 159. STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH, 
1944–1969, at 6 (1976). 
 160. J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING 
RIGHTS AND THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 35 (1999). 
 161. Id. 
 162. CHARLES L. ZELDEN, VOTING RIGHTS ON TRIAL: A HANDBOOK WITH 
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 163. See KOUSSER, supra note 144; KOUSSER, supra note 160, at 35. 
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These schemes could not entirely eliminate black voting, and 
with blacks constituting 60% of the state, as late as the 1890s there 
were some blacks in the South Carolina Legislature and representing 
the State in Congress.164 A bizarre work of gerrymander created a 
single Congressional district that snaked through six counties from 
Columbia to the coast and managed to include about 82% of the 
state’s black voters, assuring that there would usually be a single 
black Republican in Congress but also eliminating any meaningful 
black political participation in the rest of the state.165 Some blacks 
also served in the state Legislature, but the number of black 
officeholders was miniscule and hardly reflected the state’s nearly 
60% black majority in 1890.166 Despite this huge black majority, by 
the 1890s South Carolina was essentially a one-party state, with 
white Democrats controlling virtually all of state politics. For 
example, of the 160 delegates elected to the state constitutional 
convention in 1895, 154 were white Democrats and 6 were black 
Republicans,167despite the fact that blacks constituted nearly 60% of 
the state’s population.168 This new Constitution effectively ended 
black voter participation.169  
When subterfuge, confusing ballot boxes, and heavy-handed 
tactics of registrars did not work, white South Carolinians used 
fraud, intimidation, and violence to undermine the black ballot. 
Sometimes election officials moved ballot boxes to a new location 
on the day of the election, letting whites but not blacks know what 
was going on.170 It was not uncommon for white militia companies 
to parade “around town just before voting day to scare away 
blacks.”171 Between 1868 and 1876, seven black state legislators 
were murdered in South Carolina.172 Federal prosecutions in 1871 
and 1872 temporarily suppressed racist violence and the Ku Klux 
Klan,173 but peace did not last, as organized mobs and terrorists—
often led by former Confederate generals such as Matthew Calbraith 
Butler and Martin Witherspoon Gray—attacked and murdered 
blacks to suppress their political participation.174 In 1876, “over 
                                                                                                             
 164. ZELDEN, supra note 162, at 75. 
 165. Burton et al., South Carolina, supra note 152, at 193–94. 
 166. ZELDEN, supra note 162, at 75. 
 167. George B. Tindall, The Question of Race in the South Carolina 
Constitutional Convention of 1895, 37 J. NEGRO HIST. 277, 277 (1952). 
 168. In 1890, there were 462,008 whites in the state and 689,936 blacks. U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 149. 
 169. Id. 
 170. LAWSON, supra note 159, at 7. 
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 173. See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 92. 
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1064 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74 
 
 
 
seven hundred armed and mounted Democrats in red shirts seized 
control of the county courthouse” in Edgefield County, preventing 
blacks from voting.175 In 1882, an armed white mob prevented 
blacks from voting in Darlington County.176 In the aftermath of 
United States v. Cruikshank, there was little chance that the federal 
government could put a stop to this violence or that the Supreme 
Court would allow prosecutions of those who committed the 
violence. 
In 1895, South Carolina completed its disfranchisement of 
blacks with a new Constitution that contained 15 separate sections 
on voting rights.177 The new Constitution “required all voters to read 
and explain any section of the state constitution provided by the 
local voting registrar, as well as [meet] a two-year residency 
requirement.”178 The Constitution required proof of property 
ownership, payment of poll taxes, and provided disfranchisement for 
a long list of crimes but for restoration of the right to vote with a 
pardon by the Governor.179 These provisions eliminated some white 
voters, but registrars had great discretion in the questions they asked 
and the answers they accepted, which allowed them to approve 
illiterate and uneducated white voters and eliminate all but the most 
persistent and well-educated black voters. When the state 
constitutional convention began, the Charleston News and Courier 
accurately noted: “The present Constitutional Convention has been 
called to accomplish the overthrow of negro suffrage. Nobody tries 
to conceal it, nobody seeks to excuse it.”180  
The results of the laws and constitutional changes to disfranchise 
blacks from 1882 to 1895 were predictable and dramatic. In 1880, it 
is estimated that 77% of all adult black men in South Carolina voted 
in the presidential election; in 1892, following the implementation 
of the new rules of 1882, only an estimated 17% of black men 
voted.181 In 1900, only 4% of potential black voters cast ballots, and 
by 1912 this was further reduced to 2%.182  
What happened in South Carolina was hardly unique. Starting in 
the 1870s, all the former slave states began a concerted attack on 
                                                                                                             
 175. Id. at 193. 
 176. LAWSON, supra note 159, at 7. 
 177. Tindall, supra note 167. 
 178. ZELDEN, supra note 162, at 77. 
 179. S.C. CONST. of 1895, art. II, § 1–15.  
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black voting.183 By 1910, every former Confederate state had 
adopted new constitutions, laws, or both, which effectively 
eliminated black voting.184  
IV. TOWARD A JIM CROW WORLD 
The Supreme Court’s race jurisprudence in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries sent a clear signal to the South: Virtually all 
forms of private race discrimination were constitutional and not in 
conflict with the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments. Nor did the 
Court find laws mandating segregation unconstitutional. Rather than 
striking down the many badges of servitude the South created, the 
Court blithely approved them. Once in a while, the Court found that 
the Fifteenth Amendment limited some forms of violence185 or 
voting discrimination that were too obviously race-based to be 
ignored.186 But in other cases, the Court easily allowed race 
discrimination in voting, just as it allowed state-mandated or 
sanctioned race discrimination in all other aspects of southern life.187  
Segregation even trumped the early 20th century Court’s almost 
religious devotion to freedom of contract under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1905, in Lochner v. New 
York, the Court struck down a New York law limiting the hours that 
a baker could work on the grounds that the law interfered with the 
baker’s “liberty of contract,” which the Court found was a 
fundamental liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.188 However, three years later in Berea 
College v. Kentucky,189 the Court upheld a Kentucky law that 
prevented Berea College, a private institution of higher learning, 
from operating on an integrated basis.190 It is virtually impossible to 
square the liberty-of-contract arguments in Lochner with the 
outcome in Berea College. Under the analysis the Court provided in 
Lochner, the trustees of Berea College presumably had the right to 
contract with whomever they wanted to sell their product: a college 
                                                                                                             
 183. See supra note 142.  
 184. See supra note 142.  
 185. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884). 
 186. In Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915), the Court struck down 
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education. Similarly, the purchasers of this product—the students—
had a right to contract to buy the product. If whites and blacks chose 
to buy an education in an integrated context, the students should 
have had such a right under Lochner. But the Berea College Court 
did not see anything in either the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment or the right to contract under the Due 
Process Clause of the same amendment that would allow a private 
college to sell its product to anyone who wanted to purchase it.191 
The decision in Berea College underscores the racial bias of the 
Court in this period and its refusal to honestly interpret and enforce 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Blacks and white integrationists did not 
apparently have freedom of contract. 
What followed was a world of racial discrimination that seems 
almost incomprehensible today but should be remembered and 
understood. Between 1890 and the early 1950s, almost every aspect 
of life in the South was completely segregated. The majority of 
blacks, virtually 70%,192 lived in the South where segregation was 
deeply entrenched in the law and culture.193 Blacks in the North did 
not face the day-to-day de jure segregation of the South, but they 
lived in a society in which informal and de facto segregation 
affected their lives in myriad ways. But despite racial prejudice, 
most northern states banned discrimination and segregation. In 
1947, the President’s Committee on Civil Rights reported that “New 
York State, in particular, has an impressive variety of civil rights 
laws on its statute books”194 and “[a] few other states and cities have 
followed suit, especially in the fair employment practice field.”195 
This report actually understated the state of civil rights in the 
North.196 As noted above, starting in the 1880s—in response to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in The Civil Rights Cases197—most of the 
northern states had passed civil rights laws and equal 
                                                                                                             
 191. Id. 
 192. The exact amount is 68%. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE A-9[:] RACE FOR 
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 193. The best definition of the “South” is the 15 states that had slavery in 1860 
plus West Virginia and Oklahoma. All of these states had mandatory segregation 
until forced to give it up by the Supreme Court and Congress. See Paul Finkelman, 
Exploring Southern Legal History, 64 N.C. L. REV. 77 (1985). 
 194. TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE 
ON CIVIL RIGHTS 18 (U.S. Gov’t Printing Office 1947) [hereinafter THESE 
RIGHTS]. 
 195. Id. 
 196. JACK GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAW 375–79 
(1959). 
 197. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
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accommodations laws.198 Such laws were on the books at the time 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was being debated.199 However, many 
privately owned businesses ignored such laws and rarely had to 
defend their actions in the courts. Blacks reported that, despite laws 
that prohibited discrimination, it was “difficult to find a meal or a 
hotel room in the downtown areas of most northern cities.”200 
Enforcement of such laws was lax, and businesses “discouraged 
[blacks] from patronizing places by letting them wait indefinitely for 
service, charging them higher prices, giving poor service, and 
publicly embarrassing them in various ways.”201 Although illegal, 
“whites only” signs could be found in some places in the North.202 
But generally such signs were unnecessary because some businesses 
simply refused to accommodate or serve blacks. 
By the 1950s, de jure segregation was gone virtually everywhere 
in the North.203 However, throughout the North, de facto segregation 
was common in housing, which led to the de facto separation of the 
races in many public schools.204 Before the Brown decision some 
parts of the North, especially southern Illinois and Indiana, routinely 
segregated local schools despite state laws that prohibited such 
practices.205  
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However bad conditions were for blacks in the North, it was the 
South where segregation was most virulent and oppressive, and of 
course that is where seven out of ten blacks lived in 1950 and six out 
of ten lived in 1960.206 It has been nearly a half-century since the 
courts and Congress began the process of desegregating America. It 
is easy to forget how thoroughly segregated the American South was 
before the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Some descriptions 
of this era are useful. 
In his classic book, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, the great 
southern historian C. Vann Woodward surveyed the early 
development of segregation in the South. He quoted a South 
Carolina newspaper, which in 1898 attacked the growing 
segregation with an argument of reductio ad absurdum: 
If there must be Jim Crow cars on the railroads, there should 
be Jim Crow cars on the street railways. Also on all 
passenger boats. . . . If there are to be Jim Crow cars, 
moreover, there should be Jim Crow waiting saloons at all 
stations, and Jim Crow eating houses. . . . There should be 
Jim Crow sections of the jury box, and a separate Jim Crow 
dock and witness stand in every court—and a Jim Crow 
Bible for colored witnesses to kiss. It would be advisable 
also to have a Jim Crow section in county auditors’ and 
treasurers’ offices for the accommodation of colored 
taxpayers. The two races are dreadfully mixed in these 
offices for weeks.207  
Woodward then noted that within a few years, except for the “Jim 
Crow witness stand, all the improbable applications of the principle 
suggested by the editor in derision had been put into practice—down 
to and including the Jim Crow Bible.”208  
Before the Civil Rights Act of 1964, virtually every facet of life 
in the South was segregated. Southern blacks faced discrimination at 
every turn in their lives.209 If born in a hospital, southern blacks 
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entered the world in a separate hospital210 or in a separate ward of a 
hospital.211 For example, Charity Hospital in New Orleans accepted 
black patients but put them in separate wards, and until the 1960s, 
Tulane Hospital would not accept blacks at all.212 These hospitals 
were usually segregated by custom, rather than law, but as with 
many aspects of segregation, law and custom worked in tandem.213 
Black doctors were often prohibited from practicing on the Negro 
wards if whites were also in the hospital.214 But only black nurses 
could work on such wards, and they could not work on wards where 
there were white patients.215 When they died, southern blacks would 
be buried in segregated cemeteries.216 In 1944, the Swedish 
sociologist Gunnar Myrdal found that “[s]egregation is practically 
complete in the South for . . . cemeteries.”217 As the President’s 
Committee noted, in the South “it is generally illegal for Negroes to 
attend the same schools as whites; attend theaters patronized by 
whites; visit parks where whites relax; eat, sleep or meet in hotels, 
restaurants, or public halls frequented by whites.”218 The Committee 
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noted that this was “only a partial enumeration” of what was a 
“highly refined” legally required pattern of discrimination that “cut[] 
across the daily lives of southern citizens from cradle to the 
grave”219 and the system “brand[ed] the Negro with the mark of 
inferiority and assert[ed] that he [was] not fit to associate with white 
people.”220 As Lyndon Johnson came to understand through the 
experience of his cook and her husband, the indignities of 
segregation could be as pernicious as the actual denial of services 
and accommodations.221  
Segregation profoundly affected criminal justice in the South. 
With the exception of a few large cities, there were virtually no 
black police officers in the South.222 Most southern blacks lived in 
fear of law enforcement officers, especially those in rural areas and 
small towns, where policing was segregated and often oppressive. 
Police brutality toward blacks was the norm, and only the most 
egregious cases ever reached the federal courts where some relief 
might be found. By 1950, “some two-score southern cities” had at 
least a few black police officers,223 but for most of the South, the 
law had a white face, a billy club, and a license to brutalize and kill 
blacks.224 By 1959 there were 808 black officers reported in 13 
southern states, with just 60 in all of Louisiana, including 28 in New 
Orleans.225 
If arrested, blacks went to segregated jails. When convicted, they 
were sent to segregated jails, prisons, chain gangs, or reform 
schools.226 In Florida, it was illegal for any sheriff or other law 
enforcement officer to handcuff or chain blacks and whites together, 
while in Georgia black and white prisoners were to be kept separate 
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“as far as practicable.”227 Other southern states had similar laws and 
rules.228 Segregated facilities meant that black prisoners would face 
worse conditions than their white counterparts. No matter how bad 
jail and prison conditions were for whites, they would always be 
worse for blacks. As Myrdal noted, because of segregation, southern 
state officials could “purchase less food and equipment for Negroes 
than for whites and . . . discriminate in other ways.”229 In addition, 
“[t]he wardens and guards are, in all cases, Southern poor whites” 
who had little sympathy or empathy for black prisoners.230  
Furthermore, a convict leasing system gave county and state 
officials an economic incentive to vigorously prosecute all black 
lawbreakers because convicts were laborers who could be rented out 
to various southern businesses. 
In court, blacks were invariably represented by white 
attorneys,231 if they had representation at all.232 In the Scottsboro 
cases, the Supreme Court mandated that counsel be provided for 
capital defendants,233 but in Betts v. Brady—decided well before the 
Civil Rights Revolution of the 1950s and 1960s—the Court refused 
to extend this seemingly fundamental aspect of due process to non-
capital cases.234 Thus, countless poor blacks (and whites) went to 
prison with no meaningful defense. Significantly, the dissent in Betts 
came from Hugo Black, who earlier in his life had been a police 
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court judge in Birmingham, Alabama.235 Like Lyndon Johnson’s 
experience with segregation in the 1950s and 1960s, Black had 
firsthand experience with the horrors of southern justice—
particularly when it involved blacks—and understood the danger to 
civil rights and due process when defendants were without 
counsel.236 On the eve of the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 
Justice Black had the enormous satisfaction of writing the opinion in 
Gideon overturning Betts.237 
Yet, even when they had attorneys, black defendants almost 
always had white lawyers who might, or might not, offer a spirited 
defense. While some white attorneys represented their black clients 
with zeal and passion worthy of the fictional Atticus Finch,238 others 
were dilatory or worse.239 In the age before Gideon v. Wainwright, 
poor defendants were not guaranteed a lawyer in non-capital cases; 
thus, many blacks faced the court system without any formal legal 
advice or help.240 They faced white judges and all-white juries. In 
the Deep South, prison often meant laboring on a chain gang or in a 
rural work camp, where life was truly Hobbesian: brutal and 
short.241 Occasionally from the 1930s to the 1960s, civil rights 
organizations, like the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, 
were able to send lawyers—often pioneering black lawyers like 
Charles Hamilton Houston and Thurgood Marshall—to vigorously 
represent black criminal defendants.242 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 
would not cure all of these problems and in fact had little to say 
about criminal justice. But the law helped generate a change in 
political culture that would matter. Moreover, the 1964 Act set the 
stage for the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which would eventually 
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change southern politics and lead to much more substantive justice 
for blacks.  
Beyond the criminal justice system, in 1964 virtually all other 
facilities were equally segregated. Southern states segregated homes 
for the aged,243 orphanages,244 and homes or institutions for juvenile 
delinquents.245 Industrial schools were segregated where they 
existed at all for blacks. Louisiana had three industrial schools: one 
each for young white males, white females, and black males.246 
Black female youthful offenders were not offered the option of 
learning a skill or trade as part of their rehabilitation.247 In most 
southern states, African Americans with a hearing problem, a mental 
illness, or tuberculosis went to special institutions for blacks only.248 
State schools for the blind were segregated in the South even 
though, presumably, most of the students could not actually see each 
other.249 Louisiana not only required separate buildings to house and 
educate black and white blind children, but also that they be “on 
separate ground.”250 While all these institutions were in theory 
“separate but equal,” in practice they were never equal. No matter 
how bad conditions might be for whites, they were invariably worse 
for blacks. 
As the South became increasingly industrialized, segregation 
helped keep blacks economically marginalized. South Carolina 
provided $100 fines and up to 30 days imprisonment at hard labor 
for textile factory managers or owners who failed to follow 
elaborate rules for racial separations.251 The law set out in great 
detail that no company engaged in textile or cotton manufacturing—
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the most important industry in the state—could allow members of 
the 
different races to labor and work together within the same 
room, or to use the same doors of entrance and exit at the 
same time, or to use and occupy the same pay ticket 
windows or doors for paying off its operatives and laborers 
at the same time, or to use the same stairway and windows at 
the same time, or to use at any time the same lavatories, 
toilets, drinking water buckets, pails, cups, dippers or 
glasses.252 
Other states had similar rules.253 In Arkansas, Oklahoma, 
Tennessee, and Texas, mines were required to have separate shower 
facilities, clothing lockers, or both for workers when they emerged 
from the ground.254 These laws did more than just humiliate blacks, 
deny them dignity, and remind them of their inferior legal status. 
The laws also prevented them from advancing in their jobs or even 
getting jobs. Separate facilities for blacks meant that business 
owners would have to invest more money in their mills, mines, and 
factories if they wanted to hire blacks. Where possible, it made 
greater economic sense simply to hire only whites, leaving blacks 
outside the growing industrial job market. Some of this changed 
during World War II, as blacks found jobs in some southern 
industries, but job discrimination in the South was profound. This 
was even true in federal employment, where discrimination was 
theoretically illegal. In 1963, blacks made 37% of the population of 
Birmingham, but of 2,000 federal employees (outside of the post 
office and the Veterans Administration) there were only 15 blacks—
less than 1% of the total.255 
Everywhere in the South, public accommodations were 
segregated by law, custom, and public pressure—separate, but never 
actually equal.256 The South required that there be separate drinking 
fountains, restrooms, motels, hotels, elevators, bars, restaurants, and 
lunch counters for blacks.257 These were some of the issues Lyndon 
Johnson encapsulated is his short conversation with Senator Stennis. 
These rules not only separated blacks but constantly humiliated 
them.  
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Taxis served whites or blacks, not both.258 Waiting rooms at bus 
stations, train stations, and airports were separate as well. At 
theaters, blacks sat in separate sections at the back or in the balcony. 
Practice on these issues always varied. While many states mandated 
separate waiting rooms at train and bus stations, in others it was 
done by common practice. Florida found yet one more way to 
segregate, separate, and humiliate blacks by requiring that railroads 
also provide separate ticket windows for black travelers.259 All of 
these rules, laws, and practices made travel for blacks inconvenient 
or impossible. Moreover, they compounded the lack of dignity that 
the southern states perpetuated on blacks. 
Trains had separate cars for blacks,260 and buses reserved the last 
few rows for blacks, always keeping them, symbolically, at the back 
of the bus. The Jim Crow seating in trains and buses was perhaps the 
most obvious indignity that blacks faced, and it was “a common 
observation that the Jim Crow car is resented more bitterly among 
Negroes than most other forms of segregation.”261 Such rules 
reflected the Supreme Court’s decisions in Louisville, New Orleans 
& Texas Railway Co. v. Mississippi262 and Plessy v. Ferguson.263 
But in the wake of World War II, the Supreme Court abandoned this 
jurisprudence. In Morgan v. Virginia,264 Henderson v. United 
States,265 and Boynton v. Virginia,266 the Court reversed its old 
ruling in Louisville Railroad, holding that state-mandated 
segregation in interstate transportation violated the Commerce 
Clause.267 A few years later, in Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 
the Court upheld a Michigan law that required integration and equal 
accommodations in transportation, even if the mode of 
transportation traveled in interstate and international commerce.268 
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In this case, the Court affirmed a Michigan law that applied to an 
excursion boat that traveled to Canada.269 This was a long overdue 
rejection of Hall v. DeCuir, in which the Court had struck down a 
Louisiana law passed during Reconstruction that mandated 
integration on steamships.270 Finally, in a case stemming from the 
Montgomery bus boycott, the Court formally reversed Plessy v. 
Ferguson when it struck down a city ordinance in Montgomery, 
Alabama, which required segregation on public buses.271  
These decisions had virtually no effect on much of the South. 
Some bus and train companies voluntarily stopped requiring 
segregation after these decisions, but in 1959—just five years before 
Congress would pass the Civil Rights Act—Jack Greenberg of the 
NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund noted that  
none of the Southern travel segregation statutes has been 
repealed and many continue to be enforced—either by 
explicit government directive or through the more subtle 
pressures of society. Sometimes violent, terroristic efforts 
have been made to retain the old system and these have been 
followed by governmental edict to maintain segregation for 
the purpose of keeping peace. Some laws forbid 
nonsegregation on intrastate carriers, although an equally 
important purpose appears to be to retain as much 
segregation as possible on interstate vehicles. In a sense, 
therefore, segregation is “law” for local carriers in many 
Southern cities, as it is for other activities, notwithstanding 
legal prescripts to the contrary.272 
In 1961, a group of civil rights activists—known as “Freedom 
Riders”—were beaten and nearly killed as they rode integrated 
buses into the South.273 Their buses were firebombed as the nation 
looked on in horror.274 Southern white lawlessness appeared on the 
nightly news, and the federal government seemed to lack the legal 
power—and perhaps the will—to enforce the law. In the summer of 
1961, police in New Orleans harassed the Riders when their bus 
trips terminated in the city.275 “In the most blatant incident, police 
arrested three Freedom Riders in a private home, beat them up, and 
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then charged them with vagrancy, battery, and attempted escape.”276 
Interstate and intrastate transit in the South thus remained 
segregated, despite Supreme Court decisions. Only federal laws that 
emphatically rejected all segregation in interstate and intrastate 
transit, and more powerful law enforcement, would end the brutality 
and humiliation and also, of course, provide restaurants, lunch 
counters, and bathrooms for interstate travelers. This underscores 
why Lyndon Johnson could tell James Farmer that the experience of 
his cook and other black staffers in crossing the South made him 
realize “how important public accommodations were” and 
convinced him that he could never “take out the public 
accommodations section” of the Civil Rights bill.277  
Beyond public accommodations, schools, and the workplace, 
everything else was segregated. Louisiana required separate ticket 
windows and entrances at circuses and tent shows.278 The law 
required that these ticket offices be at least 25 feet apart.279 Southern 
states banned interracial meetings of fraternal orders, while cities 
and states followed Birmingham’s segregation of “any room, hall, 
theatre, picture house, auditorium, yard, court, ball park, public 
park, or other indoor or outdoor place.”280 Mobile had a 10:00 p.m. 
curfew for blacks.281 Florida stored textbooks from black and white 
schools in different buildings,282 and New Orleans segregated its red 
light district, even though prostitution itself was illegal.283 New 
Orleans allowed white men to visit prostitutes of either race, but 
required that black men only patronize black women.284 Texas 
specifically prohibited interracial boxing, and most cities and towns 
segregated seating at baseball parks, as well as the games on the 
fields.285 Local ordinances or customs made it illegal or unlikely that 
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blacks and whites would compete against each other in sporting 
events, but some states made certain this would not happen. Georgia 
specifically segregated billiard rooms and poolrooms.286 
Montgomery, Alabama, in a local ordinance, required that liquor 
stores sell to either blacks or whites but not both,287 while 
Birmingham retail stores could sell to people of all races. 
Most southern states and many cities segregated public 
recreation areas.288 South Carolina and Oklahoma segregated public 
parks and playgrounds, but in other places they were segregated by 
local ordinances or local practice.289 Some states solved the problem 
of segregation by simply not providing facilities for blacks. Thus, in 
1954 there were no state parks for blacks in Louisiana, Mississippi, 
and Texas, although some municipalities provided parks for 
blacks.290 In 1952, nine southern states had a total of 12 state parks 
for blacks and 180 for whites, although some towns and cities also 
had parks for blacks.291 In Louisiana, it was illegal for blacks and 
whites to reside in the same building, and the existence of “separate 
entrances or partitions” would not be a defense to a charge under 
this law.292 Oklahoma provided for “segregation of the white and 
colored races as to the exercises of rights of fishing, boating, and 
bathing”293 as well as “to the exercise of recreational rights” at 
parks, playgrounds, and pools.294 The State authorized the public 
service commission “to require telephone companies . . . to maintain 
separate booths for white and colored patrons.”295 When the Courts 
began to require that public recreation facilities be integrated, some 
states and cities simply chose to close their parks and swimming 
pools.296 
Even the sacred was not protected from the need of southern 
whites to separate themselves from blacks: Tennessee required that 
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houses of worship be segregated.297 Texas and North Carolina 
segregated their public libraries by statute, and other states did not 
have such laws because presumably they did not imagine blacks 
using libraries.298 Nevertheless, when blacks tried to use public 
libraries, they were either refused access or forced into segregated 
facilities.299 Georgia never seemed to tire of finding things to 
segregate and thus provided that the names of white and black 
taxpayers be made out separately on the tax digest in its 1937–1938 
legislative session.300 As Judge William H. Hastie of the Third 
Circuit concluded, “The catalog of whimsies was long.”301 These 
“whimsies,” codified by law, reminded blacks over and over again 
that in the American South, and much of the North, they could not 
expect equal treatment anywhere in society, even in houses of 
worship! Segregation harmed people in myriad ways, but at the 
heart of segregation was the denial of dignity to African Americans. 
Beyond the statutes, the “whimsies” manifested themselves as 
customs and extralegal forms of segregation. C. Vann Woodward 
was unable to find a statute requiring separate Bibles in courtrooms, 
but that was the practice everywhere.302 As Woodward noted, 
writing in 1956:  
[I]t is well to admit, and even to emphasize, that laws are not 
an adequate index of the extent and prevalence of 
segregation and discriminatory practices in the South. The 
practices often anticipated and sometimes exceeded the law. 
It may be confidentially assumed-and it could be verified by 
present observation-that there is more Jim Crowism 
practiced in the South than there are Jim Crow laws on the 
books.303  
What the historian Woodward described for the turn-of-the-
century and beyond, the economist Gunnar Myrdal observed in the 
1940s. His classic study of American race relations, An American 
Dilemma, detailed the existence of an elaborate, pernicious, and 
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pervasive system of segregation throughout the American South.304 
Myrdal noted:  
Every Southern state and most Border states have structures 
of state laws and municipal regulations which prohibit 
Negroes from using the same schools, libraries, parks, 
playgrounds, railroad cars, railroad stations, sections of 
streetcars and buses, hotels, restaurants and other facilities as 
do the whites. In the South there are, in addition, a number 
of sanctions other than the law for enforcing institutional 
segregation as well as etiquette. Officials frequently take it 
upon themselves to force Negroes into certain action when 
they have no authority to do so.305  
Significantly, Myrdal followed this description of the South by 
noting that the Supreme Court prevented, at that time, any federal 
intervention to stop this discrimination.306 Myrdal wrote, “As long 
as the Supreme Court upholds the principle established in its 
decision in 1883 [The Civil Rights Cases] to declare the federal civil 
rights legislation void, the Jim Crow laws are to be considered 
constitutional.”307  
In the South, private discrimination supplemented the laws. 
Such discrimination was not only legal everywhere but often 
required by law. Blacks could usually shop at the same department 
stores as whites, but they had to take separate elevators—usually the 
freight elevators—to the different floors.308 They might buy the 
same clothing as whites but were usually not allowed to try on the 
clothing before purchasing it.309 Even when spending their money to 
enrich white businesses, humiliation and indignity surrounded 
African Americans in the South before 1964.  
In many ways, the free market did not work for southern blacks. 
Indeed, segregation shows that modern economic theory and 
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neoclassical theory simply does not always work. Profit could not 
overcome racism. Thus, financial institutions in the South, such as 
banks, simply refused to let blacks open accounts or use their 
services.310 Banks often refused to extend credit to blacks, even to 
military veterans seeking housing loans under the GI Bill of 
Rights.311 Similarly, Myrdal found that in the South, the white 
administrators of the Federal Home Loan Bank “misused 
administrative power,” and “[i]t can almost be taken for granted that 
the temptation to discriminate against the Negro in many cases has 
been too strong to resist.”312 When John Kennedy became president, 
he issued an executive order banning racial discrimination in Federal 
Housing Authority (FHA) and Veterans Administration (VA) loans, 
which affected about a quarter of mortgages on new houses, but his 
authority did “not apply to commercially financed housing.”313 
Despite a few court victories in the 1940s and 1950s, the day-to-
day life for southern blacks was humiliating and often frightening. 
They were denied equal educational opportunity, despite the 
desegregation decisions on higher education and public schools.314 
Decent housing was often impossible to find, despite decisions 
striking down certain kinds of housing discrimination.315 As noted 
above, rulings on interstate transportation had not affected buses and 
trains entering the South or traveling solely within the region. None 
of these decisions were able to really end segregation. The Court 
could rule, as it did in Gayle v. Browder, that a city could not 
segregate its buses because this was a denial of the equal protection 
of the laws.316 But such a ruling did not prohibit a private bus 
company from discriminating. After the courts ordered the 
desegregation of the public buses in Montgomery, Alabama, “a 
group of white citizens proposed to set up a private bus line, called 
the ‘Rebel Line.’ Its obvious purpose was to furnish transportation 
for white persons only.”317 Under the Court’s ruling in The Civil 
Rights Cases, the Fourteenth Amendment did not extend to private 
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actors,318 and this private bus company might have been plausibly 
permissible. Indeed, in the 1940s, Alabama, Kentucky, and 
Maryland had not required segregation of streetcars but left “the 
practice of Jim Crowing . . . to the streetcar companies.”319 While 
this may have been an economic decision, it was a potent model for 
the entire South in the wake of decisions reversing Plessy.  
More importantly, leaving segregation in the hands of private 
actors made a great deal of sense for the South in the 1950s. By the 
eve of the 1964 Act, courts had ordered integration of most public 
facilities in the South, such as schools, public transportation, and 
even recreational facilities. Although these decisions had little effect 
on actual practice, sooner or later they might be enforced. But as 
long as the Court’s decision in The Civil Rights Cases, limiting the 
reach of the Fourteenth Amendment to a narrowly defined notion of 
“state action,” remained viable, private actors were free to 
discriminate. In the North and West, equal accommodations laws 
made such discrimination illegal, and these laws were changing—
albeit slowly—the structure of northern and western society. But in 
the South, striking down mandatory segregation laws would not 
change the society because, as Jack Greenberg noted in 1959, “[t]he 
largest part of segregation . . . is enforced by custom or 
proprietors.”320 The only way to end this sort of discrimination was 
through a national public accommodations law, which is what 
happened in 1964. 
V. LOOKING AT ONE STATE: LOUISIANA 
A careful examination of Louisiana on the eve of the passage of 
the 1964 Act illustrates the depth of segregation in America. 
Louisiana offers a useful example, in part because of intensive 
research done by scholars on that state321 and in part because of how 
Justice William O. Douglas detailed the nature of segregation there 
in his concurring opinion in Garner v. Louisiana.322 The state was 
not a bastion of violent segregation like its neighbor, Mississippi. 
The Southern Poverty Law Center, for example, cites only two civil 
rights murders in Louisiana, as compared to nearly 20 in 
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Mississippi.323 Moreover, the state had a large free black population 
before the Civil War and a large black middle class after World War 
II.324 Segregation in New Orleans was pervasive and at times 
vicious, but at the same time, the city probably had more pockets of 
racial tolerance than almost anywhere else in the Deep South;325 by 
the 1950s, private, segregated education—largely through the 
Catholic Church—allowed middle-class black Catholics to gain a 
first-class elementary and secondary education.326 But like the rest 
of the Deep South, segregation in Louisiana was the rule, with all its 
humiliation and lack of dignity, stifling of economic opportunity, 
denial of political rights, and ever-present potential for citizen and 
state-sponsored violence. 
Consider a high school student living in New Orleans, 
Louisiana, when the 1964 Act was being debated. Her birth in the 
late 1940s would have taken place in a segregated hospital or the 
special black wing of an integrated hospital. Throughout her early 
life before 1964, any black she knew who went to a hospital would 
have gone to a segregated one or the segregated wing of one. The 
perpetual lack of dignity for blacks even affected recordkeeping in 
hospitals because records for blacks were segregated from those for 
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whites.327 This humiliation extended to workers in the hospitals 
where “there [were] certain telephones only white people [could] 
use and certain ones only black people [could] use.”328 
While she was growing up, Louisiana would have offered few 
non-menial jobs for blacks. In 1943, just before she was born, the 
city of Shreveport, Louisiana, refused to accept “$67,000 in federal 
funds for a health center” because the city would not agree to “a 
hiring quota of twelve blacks for every hundred workers.”329 This is 
just one of countless examples of employment discrimination that 
was pervasive in Louisiana and the rest of the South in the 1940s 
and 1950s. It is also another illustration of the failure of neoclassical 
theory to explain segregation and racism. Southern whites were 
willing to deprive themselves of economic opportunity and 
advancement in order to maintain racial subordination. It was the 
way of the world at that time and in that place. 
All of her schooling would have been segregated, whether she 
attended public or private schools. For black Catholics who could 
afford the tuition, there were numerous parochial grammar schools 
and three excellent Catholic high schools in New Orleans: St. 
Augustine opened in 1951 and was created to educate young men 
from black Catholic families,330 St. Mary’s Academy offered a 
similar education for black Catholic girls,331 and Xavier University 
Preparatory High School served both Catholic black girls and 
boys.332 However, the majority of the city’s Catholic schools were 
closed to blacks until 1962.333 This was also true for all other high 
schools in the state, whether public or parochial. In 1940 there were 
only 39 public high schools for blacks in the entire state and 8 
Catholic schools.334 This contrasts with 383 high schools for 
whites.335 But without tuition, or if she was not Catholic, our 
hypothetical student would have attended a poorly funded and 
poorly maintained segregated public school. It was, of course, illegal 
for blacks and whites to attend the same schools in New Orleans or 
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anywhere else in the state. Simply glancing at the physical structures 
of the white and black public schools would have alerted anyone to 
the sharp contrast and the incredibly unequal educational 
opportunities offered to blacks by Louisiana’s public schools. 
Outside of New Orleans only Baton Rouge’s St. Francis Xavier 
Elementary and High School offered a full education for black 
Catholic children whose parents could afford to send them there.336 
Otherwise, black children went to segregated and utterly unequal 
schools in that city and everywhere else in the state. 
Growing up in New Orleans, she would have been aware of the 
dangers that police posed to African Americans throughout the state 
but perhaps not have known the details. In 1942, A.P. Tureaud—a 
leader of the NAACP in the state and a shrewd civil rights lawyer—
reported that police brutality was “happening every day” and that 
“[i]n recent times we have had cases of the police actually killing 
Negroes while handcuffed right here in New Orleans.”337 As Adam 
Fairclough, the most important historian of civil rights in Louisiana, 
noted, “That policemen could arrest, beat, and kill blacks without 
cause or provocation underlined black powerlessness in the cruellest 
[sic] possible manner.”338 Even when they were not killed or 
severely beaten, the constant threat of such violence was another 
aspect of the humiliation and denial of dignity that came with 
segregation. While some southern cities had black policemen at this 
time, New Orleans did not have any until 1950, when two blacks 
were hired.339 These two officers were not allowed to wear 
uniforms—they were denied the dignity of the uniform of their new 
position—and were only allowed to work with juveniles in black 
neighborhoods.340 By 1960 there were just 28 black officers in the 
city.341 Such a small number of black officers meant that almost all 
policing in the city—and the state where there were only a total of 
60 black officers342—was carried out by whites who had few 
constraints on their use of violence against blacks.  
Under Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, the Justice 
Department began to investigate police brutality in the state, but real 
success against police brutality could not come until federal civil 
rights legislation enhanced the power of the national government to 
investigate and prosecute race-based criminal behavior by the 
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police.343 Equally important, a meaningful change in southern 
policing of blacks could only come after the Civil Rights Act 
eliminated the structure of segregation that allowed the police to 
stop a black for almost anything. Warren Court decisions on 
criminal due process of course fundamentally altered police practice 
at this time,344 but without the Civil Rights Act, policemen all over 
the South would still have been able to arrest and harass blacks for 
violating the seemingly endless series of laws regulating race. 
Further, had the 1964 Act not opened up all public accommodations, 
police in segregating states would have still been able to arrest 
blacks—on trespass and similar charges—for trying to integrate 
businesses whose proprietors insisted on remaining segregated. 
Finally, in the wake of the 1964 Act and the Civil Rights movement 
the number of black police officers in New Orleans and the state of 
Louisiana would increase.345 
As she grew up in New Orleans, or anywhere else in the state, 
the high school student would have been barred from playgrounds 
where whites played and would have had trouble finding a place 
where blacks could play. “Blacks had long complained about the 
chronic shortage of parks and playgrounds, a deeply felt grievance 
in this densely populated city that endured subtropical temperatures 
for much of the year.”346 As of 1954, there were no state parks for 
blacks in Louisiana, although the state had set aside 7,000 acres of 
land for parks for whites.347 Some cities and towns did have parks 
for blacks, but they were separate and unequal. Louisiana required 
segregation in all “public parks, recreation centers, playgrounds, 
community centers, swimming pools, dance halls, golf courses, 
skating rinks, and all other recreational facilities.”348 In 1954, New 
Orleans finally gave blacks access to a part of Lake Pontchartrain at 
Lincoln Beach349 and two years later opened Pontchartrain Park for 
blacks.350 In Baton Rouge, however, there were no swimming pools 
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for blacks until private money was raised to build one in the 
1950s.351 Before then, “Negro boys were drowning in creeks, lakes, 
drainage ditches and, of course, the Mississippi River.”352 In 1963, 
the year before the Civil Rights Act, an attempt to integrate the 
public pools in Baton Rouge led to police violence and arrests.353 
Access to other forms of entertainment and recreation were 
equally constricted. Had the student gone to the circus, she would 
have been forced into a separate line at the ticket window and when 
entering the circus tent.354 She could never have used the facilities, 
amusements, or concessions at the lovely Audubon Park or the 
spacious City Park in New Orleans, although blacks were apparently 
allowed to stroll through the grounds of these parks.355 In the 1930s 
and 1940s, they would not have been allowed to sit on the benches, 
but by the 1960s this rule was gone.356 However, young black 
children could not ride on the amusements, play on the swings, or 
enjoy the pony ride. Storyland, built in the 1950s in City Park, 
offered delights to white children, but of course it was closed to 
blacks until after the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The 
humiliation of segregation affected the youngest children as well as 
the oldest, and growing up in New Orleans, black children quickly 
learned that the tantalizing rides and other adventures at the two 
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major city parks were closed to them. The hypothetical student 
might have gone swimming in the only public pool for blacks, 
which served a black population of nearly 200,000.357 Our 
hypothetical teenager would have been prohibited from entering 
some movie theaters and forced to sit in segregated seating or in a 
segregated balcony.  
Shopping in downtown would have been an ordeal. Until 1958, 
when Judge Skelly Wright ordered the integration of the city’s bus 
system, the hypothetical black resident of New Orleans would have 
had to ride at the back of a city bus in a “colored section,” and if 
there was no more room in that section, the driver could refuse to 
allow blacks to board the bus.358 By 1960, the buses had been 
legally integrated, but most blacks chose, either out of habit or out 
of fear, to sit in the back.359 Had she lived in Baton Rouge, she 
might have heard of the 1953 bus boycott there—the first of its kind 
in the nation.360 The two-week boycott in June 1953 led to a mixed 
result.361 Under a compromise, blacks would fill seats from the back 
of the bus forward, and whites would fill seats from the front of the 
bus to the back.362 This would usually prevent the situation that had 
often occurred of black patrons standing in the back of the bus while 
numerous seats remained empty in the white section. However, this 
compromise also provided that the first two rows of the bus would 
be exclusively reserved for whites.363 This result had the practical 
effect of providing much more seating for black riders but preserved 
the humiliation of segregation and continued to deny blacks 
fundamental dignity. They still could not sit anywhere they wanted. 
They still had to start sitting in the back of the bus. They still were 
not considered “good enough” to sit next to a white person, and if 
there were no whites on the bus—except the driver, because all of 
the drivers were white at this time—the first two rows would remain 
vacant and reserved for whites, even if there was a substantial 
number of blacks standing behind those two rows.364 Although this 
compromise had enormous practical value to those blacks who 
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would no longer have to stand when riding, like other aspects of 
segregation, the bus compromise in Baton Rouge reaffirmed the 
inferiority of blacks and their lack of personal dignity, even when 
they were paying the same fare as whites to ride on the same buses.  
Our hypothetical student could not have tried on clothes in stores 
serving whites,365 and she might have been forced to ride a freight 
elevator between floors. She would know to eat at home before 
venturing downtown because most restaurants and lunch counters in 
the principal shopping area were strictly segregated and would be 
closed to her. Bathrooms were always a problem, as Lyndon 
Johnson pointed out to Senator Stennis. 
In Brown, the Supreme Court declared segregated public schools 
to be unconstitutional, but public schools in New Orleans remained 
totally segregated until the early 1960s.366 In 1956, a federal district 
court ordered the integration of the New Orleans schools,367 but it 
was not until 1960 that six-year-old Ruby Nell Bridges became the 
first black child to integrate a primary school in Louisiana, or 
anywhere else in the Deep South, when she entered William Frantz 
Elementary School in New Orleans.368 In 1960, Ruby Bridges’s 
historic and courageous walk to that school—protected from a hate-
filled crowd by federal marshals—made national headlines. The 
facts surrounding the marshals escorting Bridges to the school later 
inspired Norman Rockwell’s famous painting, “The Problem We 
All Live With,” which appeared in Look Magazine369 and was seen 
by millions of Americans.370 Every day she faced a gauntlet of white 
women screaming obscenities and curses and threatening the six-
year-old girl. It was a “cacophony of profanity and abuse spewed 
out” by a mob of white women.371 The novelist John Steinbeck, 
observing the protesters outside Franz school, was revolted by their 
raw hatred. “No newspaper had printed the words these women 
shouted. It was indicated that they were indelicate, some even said 
obscene. . . . But now I heard the words, bestial and filthy and 
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degenerate.”372 Bridges suffered an eating disorder because of “one 
particular threat, reiterated daily in a shrill, insistent voice . . . a 
woman’s shout of, ‘We’re going to poison you until you choke to 
death.’”373 
Unlike parts of Virginia, New Orleans did not close its schools 
like extreme segregationists wanted,374 but only the threat of 
contempt citations forced the state board of education and other 
local and state officials to pay teachers.375 A full history of school 
desegregation in New Orleans is well beyond the scope of this 
Article, in part because the Civil Rights Act of 1964 only indirectly 
affected schooling.376 Nevertheless, from the perspective of blacks, 
the humiliation of Ruby Bridges by crowds of adult white women, 
the refusal of the State or the City to offer real protection to her, and 
the fact that she was alone in a school room for an entire year simply 
underscored the nature of segregation and dramatically illustrated 
the indignities perpetrated even on young children. 
For an entire year, Ruby Bridges was the only student in her 
classroom, as angry white parents pulled their children out of school 
rather than send them to a classroom with one black six-year-old 
child.377 That year, Ruby Bridges’s father lost his job because his 
daughter had integrated a school.378 Her grandparents, who were 
sharecroppers in Mississippi, were forced to leave the farm they had 
been on for 25 years because the landowner knew that their 
granddaughter had integrated the schools in New Orleans.379 Such 
was the racial climate in New Orleans and Mississippi and 
throughout the Deep South at the time President Kennedy proposed 
the Civil Rights Act. 
When Ruby Bridges entered a previously all-white elementary 
school in 1960, very few blacks voted in Louisiana. African 
Americans in the heavily black Seventh Ward formed the Seventh 
Ward Civil League to increase black voter registration, but they had 
limited success.380 In the 1940s, there was some increased voting 
and voter registration among blacks.381 But there was also intense 
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opposition to black voting in Louisiana, and most African 
Americans in that state had no real opportunity to vote until after the 
passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.382 
While growing up in New Orleans, every public park, recreation 
center, swimming pool, sports facility, restaurant, lunch counter—to 
name just the most common businesses and facilities—would have 
been either closed to the hypothetical black resident of New Orleans 
or open only on a segregated basis.383 However, she could have used 
the public library and even the same books as whites.384 This made 
New Orleans more progressive than some of the other southern 
cities. But inside the library, the drinking fountains and restrooms 
were segregated, and the prominent signs would have reminded her 
of the pervasive segregation of her home state and city. She would 
also have had to use separate drinking fountains and public toilet 
facilities everywhere else in the city and state as well.385 The 
indignity of segregation would have been everywhere. The blacks 
she knew would have patronized segregated barber shops and 
beauty salons and used segregated elevators if they entered 
downtown stores.386 A useful summary of the segregation laws of 
Louisiana is found in Justice William O. Douglas’s concurring 
opinion in Garner v. State of Louisiana.387 Justice Douglas noted 
that “[t]here is a deep-seated pattern of segregation of the races in 
Louisiana, going back at least to Plessy v. Ferguson.”388 In a 
footnote, he then quoted C. Vann Woodward’s The Strange Career 
of Jim Crow:  
“In bulk and detail as well as in effectiveness of enforcement 
the segregation codes were comparable with the black codes 
of the old regime, though the laxity that mitigated the 
harshness of the black codes was replaced by a rigidity that 
was more typical of the segregation code. That code lent the 
sanction of law to a racial ostracism that extended to 
churches and schools, to housing and jobs, to eating and 
drinking. Whether by law or by custom, that ostracism 
eventually extended to virtually all forms of public 
transportation, to sports and recreations, to hospitals, 
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orphanages, prisons, and asylums, and ultimately to funeral 
homes, morgues, and cemeteries.”389  
Justice Douglas next summarized the segregation laws of 
Louisiana in 1960, only six years after Brown: 
Louisiana requires that all circuses, shows, and tent 
exhibitions to which the public is invited have one entrance 
for whites and one for Negroes. No dancing, social 
functions, entertainment, athletic training, games, sports, 
contests and “other such activities involving personal and 
social contacts” may be open to both races. Any public 
entertainment or athletic contest must provide separate 
seating arrangements and separate sanitary drinking water 
and “any other facilities” for the two races. Marriage 
between members of the two races is banned. Segregation by 
race is required in prisons. The blind must be segregated. 
Teachers in public schools are barred from advocating 
desegregation of the races in the public school system. So 
are other state employees. Segregation on trains is required. 
Common carriers of passengers must provide separate 
waiting rooms and reception room facilities for the two races 
and separate toilets and separate facilities for drinking water 
as well. Employers must provide separate sanitary facilities 
for the two races. Employers must also provide separate 
eating places in separate rooms and separate eating and 
drinking utensils for members of the two races. Persons of 
one race may not establish their residence in a community of 
another race without approval of the majority of the other 
race. Court dockets must reveal the race of the parties in 
divorce actions. And all public parks, recreation centers, 
playgrounds, community centers and “other such facilities at 
which swimming, dancing, golfing, skating or other 
recreational activities are conducted” must be segregated.390  
Douglas went on to note that  
[t]hough there may have been no state law or municipal 
ordinance that in terms required segregation of the races in 
restaurants, it is plain that the proprietors in the instant cases 
were segregating blacks from whites pursuant to Louisiana’s 
custom. Segregation is basic to the structure of Louisiana as 
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a community; the custom that maintains it is at least as 
powerful as any law.391  
VI. EQUALITY, DECENCY, AND DIGNITY: THE CENTRAL MEANING OF 
CIVIL RIGHTS 
A year before the passage of the Civil Rights Act, Rev. Martin 
Luther King, Jr., was arrested in Birmingham, Alabama, facing 
various charges for protesting segregation in a state that, along with 
Mississippi, had come to represent the hate of southern racism and 
violence of the segregating South. While in jail, he wrote a letter to a 
group of southern clergymen who had suggested that his protests 
against segregation were “unwise and untimely.” His letter is a 
masterpiece in the history of social protest and thoughtful opposition 
to discrimination. It was a catalyst—one of many—that led to 
passage of the Civil Rights Act the next year. The letter eloquently 
expressed the pain and humiliation of segregation. In this letter, Dr. 
King described the nature of segregation and articulated why blacks 
could no longer wait for equality.392 More eloquently than Johnson’s 
conversation with Stennis, Dr. King shows why segregation was 
“bad” and “wrong”: 
[W]hen you suddenly find your tongue twisted and your 
speech stammering as you seek to explain to your six-year-
old daughter why she can’t go to the public amusement park 
that has just been advertised on television, and see tears 
welling up in her eyes when she is told that Funtown is 
closed to colored children . . . when you have to concoct an 
answer for a five-year-old son who is asking, “Daddy, why 
do white people treat colored people so mean?”; when you 
take a cross-country drive and find it necessary to sleep night 
after night in the uncomfortable corners of your automobile 
because no motel will accept you; when you are humiliated 
day in and day out by nagging signs reading “white” and 
“colored”; when your first name becomes “nigger,” your 
middle name becomes “boy” (however old you are) and your 
last name becomes “John,” and your wife and mother are 
never given the respected title “Mrs.”; when you are harried 
by day and haunted by night by the fact that you are Negro, 
living constantly on tiptoe stance, never quite knowing what 
to expect next, and are plagued with inner fears and outer 
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resentments; when you are forever fighting a degenerating 
sense of “nobodiness”—then you will understand why we 
find it difficult to wait.393 
The 1964 Civil Rights Act, which is celebrated and 
reconsidered in this symposium, was the most dramatic and 
powerful possible answer to this letter. When Lyndon Johnson 
signed the law, Dr. King was standing behind him.394 Both men 
understood that the national government was finally confronting 
and fighting the badness and wrongness of segregation—the 
constant humiliation and denial of dignity of people because of 
their race—nearly a century after the Civil War and the three 
amendments that followed it had given the government the tools to 
bring about legal equality. In a sense, the 1964 Act was the proper 
response—98 years later—to General Turner’s testimony before 
Congress: Major General John W. Turner reported that in his 
military district in Virginia “[a]ll of the [white] people” were 
“extremely reluctant to grant to the negro his civil rights—those 
privileges that pertain to freedom, the protection of life, liberty, 
and property before the laws, the right to testify in courts, etc.”395 
Turner noted that whites were “reluctant even to consider and treat 
the negro as a free man, to let him have his half of the sidewalk or 
the street crossing.”396 They would only “concede” such rights to 
blacks “if it is ever done, it will be because they are forced to do 
it.”397 Finally, the federal government would do the right thing—
the legal, correct thing—and force the nation to give all Americans 
their civil rights. 
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